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THE CHECKLIST 
A. CURB IMPROPER FORUM SHOPPING 
• Checklist Item #1: Determine if the court’s jurisdiction 
is appropriate for the specific case given the 
jurisdiction’s connection to the alleged exposure(s), 
parties, and witnesses; enforce venue and forum non 
conveniens laws to transfer cases more appropriately 
heard in other jurisdictions. See page 609. 
B. PRIORITIZE CLAIMS OF THE TRULY SICK 
• Checklist Item #2: Require plaintiff to show credible 
evidence of asbestos-related impairment in order to 
bring or proceed with a claim. See page 613. 
• Checklist Item #3: Establish the credibility of the 
diagnosis alleging injury by determining whether the 
claim was generated through a litigation screening or is 
supported by a report from a physician that has been 
implicated in fraudulent civil filings. See page 616. 
C. APPLY TRADITIONAL TORT LITIGATION PROCEDURES 
• Checklist Item #4: Do not consolidate dissimilar claims. 
See page 620. 
• Checklist Item #5: Assure discovery rules are 
appropriate for each claim and defendant; if “form” 
discovery is used, make sure it is appropriate and not 
overly burdensome as applied in individual cases. See 
page 621. 
• Checklist Item #6: Do not short-circuit trials. See page 
622. 
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D.  ONLY ALLOW CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS WHERE 
THERE IS A LEGAL BASIS FOR LIABILITY 
• Checklist Item #7: Premises owners generally should 
owe no duty to plaintiffs alleging harm from off-site, 
secondhand exposure to asbestos. See page 624. 
• Checklist Item #8: Maintain traditional tort law 
distinctions for when premises owners can be liable for 
injuries to contractors’ employees. See page 626. 
• Checklist Item #9: Component part manufacturers 
should not be held liable for alleged asbestos-related 
hazards in external or replacement parts made, supplied, 
or installed by others and affixed post-manufacture. See 
page 628. 
E. ONLY ALLOW A DEFENDANT TO BE HELD LIABLE IF ITS 
CONDUCT OR PRODUCT WAS A LEGAL CAUSE OF THE ALLEGED 
INJURY 
• Checklist Item #10: Make gatekeeper decisions on 
expert testimony and assure that materials experts rely 
on actually support their claims. See page 631. 
• Checklist Item #11: Adhere to traditional elements of 
substantial factor causation at summary judgment and 
provide clear jury instructions as to whether a particular 
defendant’s asbestos was a “substantial factor” in 
causing the alleged harm. See page 633. 
• Checklist Item #12: Assure specific and adequate 
product identification by dismissing cases where 
product identification is not sufficient. See page 636. 
• Checklist Item #13: Issue disease-specific causation 
requirements for mesothelioma, lung cancer and other 
asbestos-related cancers. See page 637. 
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F. ASSURE JURIES CAN FULLY COMPENSATE DESERVING 
PLAINTIFFS WHILE PRESERVING ASSETS FOR FUTURE CLAIMANTS 
• Checklist Item #14: Permit discovery of settlement 
trust claims, as well as any pre-trial settlements, and 
declare intentions to file any future claims. See page 
644. 
• Checklist Item #15: Assure proper settlement credits 
and offsets at trial with monies paid by any entity to 
satisfy a legal claim directed at the injury alleged in 
accordance with state law. See page 647. 
• Checklist Item #16: Allow collateral sources to be 
admissible so that jurors can consider and account for all 
collateral sources that provided compensation to the 
plaintiff for the alleged harm. See page 649. 
• Checklist Item #17: Instruct jurors on the state’s joint 
and several liability rules. See page 650. 
• Checklist Item #18: Sever or strike punitive damages 
claims. See page 652. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has described the asbestos 
litigation as a “crisis.”1 A hallmark of the litigation has been the 
mass filing of lawsuits by plaintiffs with little or no physical 
impairment and claims made by plaintiffs without reliable proof of 
causation, both of which have helped force scores of defendant 
companies into bankruptcy and have threatened payments to the 
truly sick.2 At times, courts have fueled the litigation by taking 
well-intentioned, but ill-suited, procedural shortcuts in an effort to 
                                                           
1 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
2 See Mark Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick 
Claimants and Solving Serious Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 331 (2002); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of 
the Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001); Richard O. Faulk, 
Dispelling the Myths of Asbestos Litigation: Solutions for Common Law 
Courts, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 945 (2003). 
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get out from under the avalanche of claims.3 In pushing for 
efficiency, however, these courts put aside normal rules of 
discovery and procedure.4 Instead of decreasing dockets, experience 
has shown that these measures actually created incentives for 
personal injury lawyers to file more claims.5 In recent years, courts 
and legislatures in key asbestos jurisdictions that have appreciated 
these unintended consequences have begun restoring fundamental 
tort law principles to asbestos litigation. By doing so, they have 
helped root out many of the abusive practices and claims that had 
plagued the litigation. As a result, the overall asbestos litigation 
environment has shown signs of improvement.6 
Whether recent advances in the litigation will be lasting is a 
question yet to be answered. Asbestos litigation has a way of 
reinventing itself. As one legal observer explained, “the next 
asbestos is always asbestos, because the litigation always moves 
on.”7 Asbestos personal injury lawyers are creative in finding new 
tactics to expand liability. In addition, there has been a new 
migration of claims to jurisdictions where trial judges may not be 
experienced in managing asbestos dockets. These judges may not be 
aware of the issues, history and tactics particular to asbestos 
litigation. 
                                                           
3 See Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended 
Consequences in Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline The Litigation 
Have Fueled More Claims, 71 MISS. L.J. 531 (2001). 
4 See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation’s 
Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency is Hurting You and Innocent 
Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247 (2000). 
5 See id. 
6 See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: 
The Tide Appears to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 477 (2006); James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Asbestos Litigation Madness: Have the States Turned a 
Corner?, 3:6 MEALEY’S TORT REFORM UPDATE 23 (Jan. 18, 2006); Patti 
Waldmeir, Asbestos Litigation Declines in Face of US Legal Reforms, FIN. 
TIMES, July 24, 2006, at 2; Paul Davies, Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits Against 
Companies Sharply Decline, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter 
Davies, Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits Against Companies Sharply Decline]. 
7 See Peter Geier, ‘Sea Change’ In Asbestos Torts Is Here: New Strategies, 
New Defendants Seen, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 1 (quoting attorney Mark 
Behrens). 
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This article collects lessons learned from the past by courts 
with experience handling asbestos claims and translates them into a 
checklist of trial action items so that trial judges who may be new 
to this litigation can avoid some of the more serious problems of 
the past and better address the next evolution of claims. 
II. A PRIMER ON THE ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
A. The Number of Claims Explodes 
The initial asbestos-related lawsuits were filed in the 1970s.8 
By the 1980s, “what had once been a series of isolated cases turned 
into a steady flow,” which continued to increase over the next 
decade.9 By the early 1990s, courts and commentators recognized 
that the “elephantine mass” of asbestos cases that were then being 
filed created extraordinary problems.10 In 1991, the Federal Judicial 
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation called the 
litigation “a disaster of major proportions.”11 The Ad Hoc 
Committee explained: 
The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be 
briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts 
continue to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; 
the same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs 
                                                           
8 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 
9 See ABA COMM’N ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 5 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/ 
full_report.pdf [hereinafter ABA COMM’N REP.]. 
10 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 166 (2003) (quoting 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)); see also In re 
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2005) (“For decades, the 
state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos 
lawsuits.”). 
11 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, 
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (Mar. 1991), reprinted in 6:4 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REPS.: ASBESTOS 2 (Mar. 15, 1991) [hereinafter JUD. CONF. 
REP.]. 
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exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to one; 
exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and 
future claimants may lose altogether.12 
Even after this gloomy assessment, the litigation worsened “at 
a much more rapid pace than even the most pessimistic 
projections.”13 During the 1990s, the number of asbestos cases 
pending nationwide doubled from 100,000 to more than 200,000.14 
By 2002, approximately 730,000 claims had been filed,15 with 
more than 100,000 claims filed in 2003 alone—“the most in a single 
year.”16 In August 2005, the Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that approximately 322,000 asbestos-related claims were 
pending in state and federal courts.17 
B. Most Plaintiffs Had No Physical Injury from Asbestos 
Exposure 
The primary reason for this explosion in claims was that by the 
early 2000s, the overwhelming majority of claims—up to 90 
percent—were filed on behalf of plaintiffs who were “completely 
asymptomatic.”18 These claimants may have had some marker of 
                                                           
12 Id. at 2–3. 
13 GRIFFIN B. BELL, NAT’L LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, Asbestos 
Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts’ Duty to Help Solve the 
Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 6:6 BRIEFLY, June 2002, at 2. 
14 See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on 
H.R. 1283, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 62 (1999) 
(statement of Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter 
Edley Testimony]. 
15 See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND, ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxiv 
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG162.  
16 Editorial, The Asbestos Blob, Cont., WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2004, at 
A16. 
17 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES’ MASS TORTS SUBCOMMITTEE, 
OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS CLAIMS AND TRENDS 5 (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/asbestos_aug07.pdf [hereinafter AM. ACAD. 
ACTUARIES]. 
18 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone 
Mad: Exposure-based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and 
Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 823 (2002); see also Roger Parloff, 
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exposure, such as changes in the pleural membrane of their lungs, 
but “are not now and never will be afflicted by disease.”19 In 
contrast, when asbestos litigation first arose in the 1960s, most 
claimants were “workers suffering from grave and crippling 
maladies.”20 
The key development was the use of mass screenings by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and their agents to generate many of the 
unimpaired claimant filings.21 U.S. News & World Report described 
the claimant recruiting process: 
                                                           
Welcome to the New Asbestos Scandal, FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 2004, at 186 
(“According to estimates accepted by the most experienced federal judges in this 
area, two-thirds to 90% of the nonmalignants are ‘unimpaireds’—that is, they 
have slight or no physical symptoms.”); Kathryn Kranhold, GE To Record $115 
Million Expense for Asbestos Claims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2007, at A3 (GE 
reporting that more than 80% of its pending cases involve claimants “who 
aren’t sick”); Quenna Sook Kim, G-I Holdings’ Bankruptcy Filing Cites 
Exposure in Asbestos Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12 (“[A]s many 
as 80% of [GAF’s] asbestos settlements are paid to unimpaired people.”); Alex 
Berenson, A Surge in Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2002, at A15. 
19 Edley Testimony, supra note 14, at 67. 
20 Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice; Asbestos 
Lawyers Are Pitting Plaintiffs Who Aren’t Sick Against Companies that Never 
Made the Stuff—and Extracting Billions for Themselves, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 
2002, at 158. 
21 See Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos & The Sleeping Constitution, 31 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2003). Screenings have frequently been conducted in areas with high 
concentrations of workers who may have worked in jobs where they were 
exposed to asbestos. See Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 322 
B.R. 719, 723 (D. Del. 2005) (“Labor unions, attorneys, and other persons 
with suspect motives [have] caused large numbers of people to undergo X-ray 
examinations (at no cost), thus triggering thousands of claims by persons who 
had never experienced adverse symptoms.”); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos 
Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 309 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 2002) (asbestos 
claimants “are diagnosed largely through plaintiff-lawyer arranged mass 
screenings programs targeting possible exposed asbestos-workers and attraction 
of potential claimants through the mass media.”); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. 
Am. Employers’ Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Mass. 1989) (“[M]any 
of these cases result from mass X-ray screenings at occupational locations 
conducted by unions and/or plaintiffs’ attorneys, and many claimants are 
functionally asymptomatic when suit is filed.”). 
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To unearth new clients for lawyers, screening firms 
advertise in towns with many aging industrial workers or 
park X-ray vans near union halls. To get a free X-ray, 
workers must often sign forms giving law firms 40 percent 
of any recovery. One solicitation reads: “Find out if YOU 
have MILLION DOLLAR LUNGS!”22 
Many X-ray interpreters (called “B Readers”) hired by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers were “so biased that their readings were simply 
unreliable.”23 As one physician explained, “the chest x-rays are not 
read blindly, but always with the knowledge of some asbestos 
exposure and that the lawyer wants to file litigation on the 
worker’s behalf.”24 
It is estimated that more than one million workers have 
undergone attorney-sponsored screenings.25 One worker explained, 
“[i]t’s better than the lottery. If they find anything, I get a few 
thousand dollars I didn’t have. If they don’t find anything, I’ve just 
                                                           
22 Pamela Sherrid, Looking for Some Million Dollar Lungs, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 36. 
23 Owens Corning, 322 B.R. at 723; see also ABA COMM’N REP., supra 
note 9 (litigation screening companies find X-ray evidence that is “consistent 
with” asbestos exposure at a “startlingly high” rate, often exceeding 50% and 
sometimes reaching 90%); Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of “B” 
Readers’ Interpretations of Chest Radiographs for Asbestos Related Changes, 
11 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 843 (2004) (B Readers hired by plaintiffs claimed 
asbestos-related lung abnormalities in 95.9% of the X-rays sampled, but 
independent B Readers found abnormalities in only 4.5% of the same X-rays); 
John M. Wylie II, The $40 Billion Scam, READER’S DIGEST, Jan. 2007, at 74; 
Editorial, Beware the B-Readers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2006, at A16. As a 
result of its findings, the ABA Commission proposed the enactment of federal 
legislation to codify the evidence that physicians recognize is needed to show 
impairment. The ABA’s House of Delegates adopted the Commission’s 
proposal in February 2003. See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., Appen. A (Mar. 5, 2003) (statement of 
Dennis Archer, President-Elect, ABA). 
24 David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 
31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 13 (2003) (quoting Lawrence Martin, M.D.). 
25 See Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos 
Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality?, 31 PEPP. L. 
REV. 33, 69 (2003); see also Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos 
Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 836–37 (2005). 
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lost an afternoon.”26 If not for the mass filing by the unimpaired, 
the asbestos litigation crisis may never have arisen.27 
C. Most Defendants Had Little, If Any, Connection to the 
Alleged Exposure 
At the same time that tens of thousands of unimpaired claims 
were being mass produced, many “traditional” asbestos defendants 
who manufactured, mined, or sold asbestos28 were seeking 
bankruptcy court protection.29 The pace of bankruptcies 
accelerated after 2000;30 it is now estimated that at least 85 
companies have been forced into bankruptcy as a result of 
                                                           
26 Andrew Schneider, Asbestos Lawsuits Anger Critics, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2003, at A1. 
27 See Lester Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the 
Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 243, 273 (2001); see also Wilson v. AC&S, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 
682, 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“The extraordinary volume of nonmalignant 
asbestos cases continues to strain federal and state courts.”), dismissed, 864 
N.E.2d 645 (Ohio 2007). 
28 As Judge Freeman who administers the asbestos docket in New York has 
explained,  
[t]here are noteworthy differences between the bankrupt defendants and 
those that are still solvent. As a group, the bankrupt corporations can 
be characterized as ‘traditional’ asbestos defendants; they either mined 
asbestos, or manufactured, sold, distributed or required asbestos-
containing products, including insulation, fire-proofing, construction 
materials, and boilers. Until recently, these ‘traditional’ defendants 
were the plaintiffs’ primary targets. 
In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 750 N.Y.S.2d 469, 473–74 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2002). Traditional asbestos defendants include Johns-Manville, Owens-
Corning, Celotex, Pittsburgh Corning, Eagle-Picher, and Raybestos Manhattan. 
29 See In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[M]ounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into 
bankruptcy.”). 
30 See Christopher Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-
Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 392 (1993) (observing that each 
time a defendant declares bankruptcy, “mounting and cumulative” financial 
pressure is placed on the “remaining defendants, whose resources are limited”). 
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asbestos-related liabilities.31 
As a direct result of these bankruptcies, the net of liability 
“spread from the asbestos makers to companies far removed from 
the scene of any putative wrongdoing.”32 One well-known 
plaintiffs’ attorney has described the litigation as an “endless 
search for a solvent bystander.”33 By 2004, more than 8,500 
defendants were caught up in the litigation34—up from the 300 
defendants in 1983.35 This dramatic increase in claims has been 
possible because of “the erosion or elimination of standards of 
recovery, particularly causation and product identification.”36 At 
least one company in nearly every U.S. industry is involved in the 
litigation.37 Nontraditional defendants now account for more than 
half of asbestos litigation expenditures.38 
D. Jurisdictions Were Targeted, Causing the Legal Systems to 
Crack 
Another key factor accelerating the asbestos litigation has been 
the concentration of claims in certain jurisdictions. RAND found 
that from 1998 to 2000, eleven states saw the brunt of asbestos 
filings: Texas (19%), Mississippi (18%), New York (12%), Ohio 
                                                           
31 See Martha Neil, Backing Away from the Abyss, 92 ABA J. 26, 29 
(2006). 
32 Editorial, Lawyers Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at 
A14; see also Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the Crisis in the Civil Justice System 
Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1151–52 (2005) (discussing 
spread of asbestos litigation to “peripheral defendants”). 
33 ‘Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation’—A Discussion with 
Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17:3 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 
5 (Mar. 1, 2002) (quoting Richard Scruggs). 
34 See Deborah R. Hensler, California Asbestos Litigation—The Big 
Picture, PERSPECTIVES FROM HARRISMARTIN’S COLUMNS—ASBESTOS, Aug. 
26, 2004. 
35 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
12 (1983). 
36 James Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 223, 236 (2006). 
37 AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES, supra note 17, at 5. 
38 See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 15, at 94. 
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(12%), Maryland (7%), West Virginia (5%), Florida (4%), 
Pennsylvania (3%), California (2%), Illinois (1%), and New Jersey 
(1%).39 Sorting through the mass amount of claims against scores of 
peripheral defendants placed significant pressure on courts where 
asbestos claims were filed.40 
Initially, some courts with thousands of lawsuits on their 
dockets began taking well-intentioned, but ill-fated, procedural 
shortcuts to usher the claims through the system. One such 
example was the joining of a significant number of dissimilar claims 
for trial. The largest single mass consolidation took place in West 
Virginia in 2002, where the trial court joined more than 8,000 
plaintiffs suing more than 250 defendants.41 The threat of massive 
liability, including punitive damages, without attention paid to 
individual claims and defenses, caused nearly every defendant to 
settle for reportedly huge sums of money.42 Other mass 
consolidations occurred in Virginia and Mississippi.43 These 
                                                           
39 See id. at 62. 
40 Former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Conrad L. Mallett, Jr. 
described the situation facing many judges with heavy asbestos caseloads in 
testimony before Congress. See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 
1999: Hearing on H.R. 1283 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. 6 (July 1, 1999) (statement of the Hon. Conrad L. Mallett, Jr.). He 
observed that trial court judges inundated with asbestos claims might feel 
compelled to shortcut procedural rules:  
Think about a county circuit judge who has dropped on her 5,000 cases 
all at the same time . . . . [I]f she scheduled all 5,000 cases for one 
week trials, she would not complete her task until the year 2095. The 
judge’s first thought then is, “How do I handle these cases quickly and 
efficiently?” The judge does not purposely ignore fairness and truth, but 
the demands of the system require speed and dictate case consolidation 
even where the rules may not allow joinder. 
Id. 
41 See State ex rel. Mobil Corp. v. Gaughan, 565 S.E.2d 793, 794 (W. Va. 
2002). 
42 See Mobil Settles, Leaving Carbide as Lone Asbestos Defendant, ASSOC. 
PRESS STATE & LOCAL NEWSWIRE, Oct. 10, 2002. 
43 See In re Hopeman Bros., Inc., 569 S.E.2d 409 (Va. 2002); The 
Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Legislative Hearing on H.R. 
1283 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 39–40 (1999) 
(statement of Professor William Eskridge, Yale Law School), available at 
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consolidations “so depart[ed] from [the] accepted norm as to be 
presumptively violative of due process.”44 They often lumped 
together people with serious illnesses, such as mesothelioma or 
lung cancer, with claimants having different alleged harms or no 
illness at all.45 Work histories and exposure levels among plaintiffs 
varied widely.46 
In addition to fundamental unfairness and due process 
concerns, the aggregation of dissimilar claims turned out to be a bit 
like using a lawn mower to cut down weeds. The practice provided 
a temporary fix, but created more problems than it solved in the 
long run. Duke University Law School Professor Francis 
McGovern has explained,  
[j]udges who move large numbers of highly elastic mass 
torts through their litigation process at low transaction 
costs create the opportunity for new filings. They increase 
demand for new cases by their high resolution rates and low 
transaction costs. If you build a superhighway, there will be 
a traffic jam.47  
One West Virginia trial judge involved in asbestos litigation 
                                                           
http://judiciary.house.gov/judiciary/eskr0701.htm; John H. Beisner et al., One 
Small Step for a County Court . . . One Giant Calamity for the National Legal 
System, 7 CIVIL JUSTICE REP. 16 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www. 
manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_07.pdf. 
44 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993). 
45 See State ex rel. Mobil Corp. v. Gaughan, 565 S.E.2d 793, 794 (W. Va. 
2002) (Maynard, J., concurring). Justice Elliott Maynard of the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals has explained that mass consolidations involve  
thousands of plaintiffs; twenty or more defendants; hundreds of different 
work sites located in a number of different states; dozens of different 
occupations and circumstances of exposure; dozens of different products 
with different formulations, applications, and warnings; several different 
diseases; numerous different claims at different stages of development; 
and at least nine different law firms, with differing interests, representing 
the various plaintiffs. Additionally, the challenged conduct spans the 
better part of six decades. 
Id. 
46 See id. 
47 Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in 
Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 606 (1997). 
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acknowledged this fact: 
I will admit that we thought that [an early mass trial] was 
probably going to put an end to asbestos, or at least knock 
a big hole in it. What I didn’t consider was that that was a 
form of advertising. That when we could whack that batch 
of cases down that well, it drew more cases.48 
This phenomenon is due to the fact that in filing asbestos-related 
claims, there has been no relationship between the incidence of 
disease and the number of suits filed.49 
Consolidations and other procedural shortcuts, along with a 
few high-profile verdicts and well-developed litigation tactics by 
lawyers, forced defendants to settle claims, often en mass, rather 
than sort through them and only pay the meritorious ones. One 
particularly troubling tactic was the naming of scores, sometimes 
hundreds, of defendants in a single exposure case50 and then settling 
most of them for a modest amount (often less than $1,000) that 
collectively generated tens of thousands of dollars for unimpaired 
claimants without having to show specific harm or causation 
against a named defendant. 
                                                           
48 Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco, 
Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation versus 
Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans That Defer 
Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 271, 284–85 (2003) (quoting 
In re Asbestos Litig., Civ. Action No. 00-Misc.-222 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha 
County, W. Va. Nov. 8, 2000)); see also Helen E. Freedman, Product Liability 
Issues in Mass Torts—View from the Bench, 15 TOURO L. REV. 685, 688 
(1999) (Judge overseeing New York City asbestos litigation stating, 
“[i]ncreased efficiency may encourage additional filings and provide an overly 
hospitable environment for weak cases.”). 
49 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis Continues: It Is Time for Congress to 
Act: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. Mar. 5, 
2003 (statement of David Austern, Trustee for the Manville Trust) available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=617&wit_id=1675.  
 David Austern, Trustee for the Manville Trust, has described the asbestos 
claim generation process as the economic model of claims filing as opposed to a 
medical model. See id. 
50 See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: 
Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 272 
(2005). 
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E. Payments to Truly Sick Became Threatened 
Over the last few years, it has become clear that mass filings by 
unimpaired claimants have exhausted scarce resources that should 
go to “the sick and the dying, their widows and survivors.”51 The 
“very small percentage of the cases filed [with] serious asbestos-
related afflictions . . . [were] prone to be lost in the shuffle.”52 For 
example, the Manville trustees reported that a “disproportionate 
amount of Trust settlement dollars have gone to the least injured 
claimants—many with no discernible asbestos-related physical 
impairment whatsoever.”53 The Trust is now paying out five cents 
on the dollar to asbestos claimants.54 Other asbestos-related 
bankruptcy trusts, such as the Celotex and Eagle-Picher Settlement 
Trusts, also have had to cut payments to claimants.55 
Some lawyers who represented the sick claimants have since 
joined with defendants and others in calling for a return of the rule 
of law in asbestos litigation. Here is what some of these lawyers 
                                                           
51 In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Larson v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1986) (“We believe that 
discouraging suits for relatively minor consequences of asbestos exposure will 
lead to a fairer allocation of resources to those victims who develop cancers.”); In 
re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 751 (E.D.N.Y. & 
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Overhanging this massive failure of the present system is the 
reality that there is not enough money available from traditional defendants to 
pay for current and future claims.”), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992); In re 
Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Admin. Order No. 8, 2002 WL 
32151574, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2002) (“Oftentimes these suits are brought 
on behalf of individuals who are asymptomatic as to an asbestos-related illness 
and may not suffer any symptoms in the future. Filing fees are paid, service costs 
incurred, and defense files are opened and processed. Substantial transaction 
costs are expended and therefore unavailable for compensation to truly 
ascertained asbestos victims.”). 
52 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, 1996 WL 
539589, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996). 
53 Quenna Sook Kim, Asbestos Trust Says Assets Are Reduced as the 
Medically Unimpaired File Claims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at B6. 
54 Id. 
55 See Mark Goodman et al., Editorial, Plaintiffs’ Bar Now Opposes 
Unimpaired Asbestos Suits, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 1, 2002, at B14.; Stengel, supra 
note 36, at 262. 
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have said: 
• Matthew Bergman of Seattle: “Victims of mesothelioma, 
the most deadly form of asbestos-related illness, suffer the 
most from the current system . . . [T]he genuinely sick and 
dying are often deprived of adequate compensation as more 
and more funds are diverted into settlements of the non-
impaired claims.”56 
• Peter Kraus of Dallas: Plaintiffs’ lawyers who file suits 
on behalf of the non-sick are “sucking the money away 
from the truly impaired.”57 
• Terrence Lavin of Chicago (and former Illinois State Bar 
President): “Members of the asbestos bar have made a 
mockery of our civil justice system and have inflicted 
financial ruin on corporate America by representing people 
with nothing more than an arguable finding on an X-ray.”58 
• Steve Kazan of Oakland: “The current asbestos litigation 
system is a tragedy for our clients. We see people every 
day who are very seriously ill. Many have only a few 
months to live. It used to be that I could tell a man dying of 
mesothelioma that I could make sure that his family would 
be taken care of. That statement was worth a lot to my 
clients, and it was true. Today, I often cannot say that any 
more. And the reason is that other plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
filing tens of thousands of claims every year for people 
who have absolutely nothing wrong with them.”59 
 
                                                           
56 Matthew Bergman & Jackson Schmidt, Editorial, Change Rules on 
Asbestos Lawsuits, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 30, 2002, at B7. 
57 Susan Warren, Competing Claims: As Asbestos Mess Spreads, Sickest 
See Payouts Shrink, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A1. 
58 Editorial, ABA Backs Asbestos Reform, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at 
B2. 
59 See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Steven Kazan), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=472&wit_ id=1206. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CHECKLIST FOR FAIRLY MANAGING 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
Over the last several years, courts and legislatures have begun 
restoring the rule of law to asbestos litigation, taking measures to 
rein in the most prevalent abuses in the litigation. These actions, 
which are set forth in the checklist below, have aided the fair 
treatment of both seriously injured asbestos claimants and 
defendants where the litigation has been most prolific. In particular, 
there is now greater recognition that it is unsound public policy to 
award damages to plaintiffs who have no current physical 
impairment from exposure to asbestos.60 Rather, it is best to 
prioritize the claims of those who are truly sick and preserve assets 
for those injured parties. Courts also have taken measures that 
allow claims to be determined more accurately, on their merits, and 
in appropriate jurisdictions. In addition, many courts are taking a 
much more thorough look at issues such as duty and the science of 
unsound causation claims by plaintiffs’ experts. Trial courts should 
use this checklist to heed the lessons of the past and produce 
sound asbestos litigation results in the future. 
The categories and checklist items are as follows: 
A. CURB IMPROPER FORUM SHOPPING 
• Checklist Item #1: Determine if the court’s jurisdiction 
is appropriate for the specific case given the 
jurisdiction’s connection to the alleged exposure(s), 
                                                           
60 See, e.g., Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 531 (2007) (“[I]t is unreasonable to 
compensate hundreds of thousands of people exposed to asbestos, who may have 
physical markers of exposure, but who have no current impairment from a 
disease caused by asbestos exposure.”); Matthew Mall, Note, Derailing the 
Gravy Train: A Three-Pronged Approach to End Fraud in Mass Tort 
Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2043, 2061–62 (2007) (“By limiting 
cases to those claimants suffering from actual, physical impairment, [medical 
criteria laws requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate asbestos-related physical 
impairment] reserve judicial resources and corporate money for those claimants 
that need it most.”). 
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parties, and witnesses; enforce venue and forum non 
conveniens laws to transfer cases more appropriately 
heard in other jurisdictions. 
B. PRIORITIZE CLAIMS OF THE TRULY SICK 
• Checklist Item #2: Require plaintiff to show credible 
evidence of asbestos-related impairment in order to 
bring or proceed with a claim. 
• Checklist Item #3: Establish the credibility of the 
diagnosis alleging injury by determining whether the 
claim was generated through a litigation screening or is 
supported by a report from a physician that has been 
implicated in fraudulent civil filings. 
C. APPLY TRADITIONAL TORT LITIGATION PROCEDURES 
• Checklist Item #4: Do not consolidate dissimilar claims. 
• Checklist Item #5: Assure discovery rules are 
appropriate for each claim and defendant; if “form” 
discovery is used in one’s jurisdiction, make sure it is 
appropriate and not overly burdensome as applied in 
individual cases. 
• Checklist Item #6: Do not short-circuit trials. 
D.  ONLY ALLOW CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS WHERE 
THERE IS A LEGAL BASIS FOR LIABILITY 
• Checklist Item #7: Premises owners generally should 
owe no duty to plaintiffs alleging harm from off-site, 
secondhand exposure to asbestos. 
• Checklist Item #8: Maintain traditional tort law 
distinctions for when premises owners can be liable for 
injuries to contractors’ employees. 
• Checklist Item #9: Component part manufacturers 
should not be held liable for alleged asbestos-related 
hazards in external or replacement parts made, supplied, 
or installed by others and affixed post-manufacture. 
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E. ONLY ALLOW A DEFENDANT TO BE HELD LIABLE IF ITS 
CONDUCT OR PRODUCT WAS A LEGAL CAUSE OF THE ALLEGED 
INJURY 
• Checklist Item #10: Make gatekeeper decisions on 
expert testimony and assure that materials experts rely 
on actually support their claims. 
• Checklist Item #11: Adhere to traditional elements of 
substantial factor causation at summary judgment and 
provide clear jury instructions as to whether a particular 
defendant’s asbestos was a “substantial factor” in 
causing the alleged harm. 
• Checklist Item #12: Assure specific and adequate 
product identification by dismissing cases where 
product identification is not sufficient. 
• Checklist Item #13: Issue disease-specific causation 
requirements for mesothelioma, lung cancer and other 
asbestos-related cancers. 
F. ASSURE JURIES CAN FULLY COMPENSATE DESERVING 
PLAINTIFFS WHILE PRESERVING ASSETS FOR FUTURE CLAIMANTS 
• Checklist Item #14: Permit discovery of settlement 
trust claims, as well as any pre-trial settlements, and 
declare intentions to file any future claims. 
• Checklist Item #15: Assure proper settlement credits 
and offsets at trial with monies paid by any entity to 
satisfy a legal claim directed at the injury alleged in 
accordance with state law. 
• Checklist Item #16: Allow collateral sources to be 
admissible so that jurors can consider and account for all 
collateral sources that provided compensation to the 
plaintiff for the alleged harm. 
• Checklist Item #17: Instruct jurors on the state’s joint 
and several liability rules. 
• Checklist Item #18: Sever or strike punitive damages 
claims. 
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The actions included in these checklist items, along with state 
medical criteria laws and other legislative reforms, have proven to 
be effective in reducing the number of premature and abusive 
claims. Jennifer Biggs, who chairs the Mass Torts Subcommittee of 
the American Academy of Actuaries, has found that “[a] lot of 
companies that were seeing 40,000 cases in 2002 and 2003 have 
dropped to the 15,000 level.”61 Frederick Dunbar, a senior vice 
president of NERA Economic Consulting, recently studied the 
Securities and Exchange Commission filings of eighteen large 
asbestos defendants and found that, “for all of them, 2004 asbestos 
claims had dropped from peak levels of the previous three years. 
Ten companies saw claims fall by more than half between 2003 and 
2004.”62 A prominent Ohio asbestos litigation defense lawyer has 
said that Ohio’s medical criteria law “dramatically cut the number 
of new case filings by more than 90%.”63 The CEO of a large 
mutual insurer further highlighted the effects of recent asbestos 
reforms at the state level in testimony before Congress: 
The beneficial impact of these efforts cannot be overstated. 
Historically Texas, Ohio and Mississippi have been the 
leading states to generate claims filed against [our] 
policyholders, collectively accounting for approximately 
80% of the asbestos claims filed against [our] insureds. 
Since the statutory and judicial reforms in those three key 
states, the decrease in the volume of claims has been truly 
remarkable. In Mississippi, the decrease has been 90%, in 
Texas nearly 65% and, in Ohio, approximately 35%. 
Across all states, from 2004 to 2005 we have seen over a 
50% decrease in the number of new claims filed, a trend that 
continued in 2006. These numbers are the best evidence 
that state-driven initiatives are working . . . .64 
                                                           
61 Alison Frankel, Asbestos Removal, 28:7 AM. LAW., July 2006, at 15. 
62 Id.; see also Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, State-Based 
Reforms: Making a Difference in Asbestos and Silica Cases, 28 No. 22 
ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 12 (2006). 
63 Peter Geier, States Taking up Medical Criteria: Move is to Control 
Asbestos Caseload, NAT’L L.J., May 22, 2006, at 1. 
64 The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Legislative 
Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., at 5 (2006) 
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A.  Curb Improper Forum Shopping 
1. Checklist Item #1: Determine if the court’s jurisdiction is 
appropriate for the specific case given the jurisdiction’s 
connection to the alleged exposure(s), parties, and 
witnesses; enforce venue and forum non conveniens laws 
to transfer cases more appropriately heard in other 
jurisdictions. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers often strategically flock to forums where 
they believe they have a tactical advantage rather than file where 
there is a logical and factual connection to a claim or claimant.65 
Indeed, throughout the past thirty years, asbestos claims have 
shown a remarkable ability to migrate from state-to-state and 
jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction depending on which courts plaintiffs’ 
lawyers believed would give them the greatest chance of achieving 
favorable recoveries.66 Given the scores of defendants typically 
                                                           
(testimony of Edmund F. Kelly, Chairman, President & CEO, Liberty Mutual 
Group). 
65 See Richard Scruggs, Asbestos for Lunch, Panel Discussion at the 
Prudential Securities Financial Research and Regulatory Conference (May 9, 
2002), in Industry Commentary (Prudential Securities, Inc., N.Y., New York), 
June 11, 2002, at 5; see also Richard Scruggs, Tobacco Lawyers’ Roundtable: 
A Report from the Front Lines, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 545 (2001). 
Mississippi plaintiffs’ lawyer Richard Scruggs has dubbed these places “magic 
jurisdictions” because they have reputations for producing large settlements and 
verdicts:  
What I call the “magic jurisdiction,” . . . [is] where the judiciary is 
elected with verdict money. The trial lawyers have established 
relationships with the judges that are elected; they’re State Court 
judges; they’re popul[ists]. They’ve got large populations of voters 
who are in on the deal, they’re getting their [piece] in many cases. And 
so, it’s a political force in their jurisdiction, and it’s almost impossible 
to get a fair trial if you’re a defendant.  
Id. 
66 See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 15, at 61–62. RAND found that from 
1970 through 1987 California bore 31% of asbestos claims that were filed, but 
only 5% from 1988 to 1992, 2% from 1993 to 1997, and 2% from 1998 to 
2000. Texas trended in the opposite direction, accounting for only 3% of initial 
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named in asbestos cases, plaintiffs’ lawyers often have numerous 
jurisdictions from which to choose. In addition, some companies 
are named “simply to try and keep the cases” in certain 
jurisdictions.67 
From the mid-1990s through 2003, Madison County, Illinois 
was a particularly popular destination for asbestos litigation.68 
Asbestos claims had risen quickly from 65 in 1996 to a peak of 953 
in 2003.69 During those years, Madison County received significant 
negative publicity for hearing cases that did not have the proper 
connections to the County.70 In response, the Illinois Supreme 
Court has removed some of the “pull” from the magnet 
jurisdictions. In Dawdy v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,71 the court held 
that a foreign plaintiff’s forum choice deserves less deference if it is 
not the plaintiff’s home.72 In Gridley v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins. Co.,73 the court remanded a Louisiana man’s case who was not 
injured in Illinois with directions to dismiss the complaint based on 
forum non conveniens.74 In addition, a new judge was appointed to 
oversee Madison County’s asbestos docket.75 He began enforcing 
the state’s venue and forum non conveniens laws.76 In one of his 
                                                           
asbestos claims filed from 1970 to 1987, 15% from 1988 to 1992, an astounding 
44% from 1993 to 1997, and 19% from 1998 to 2000. Id. 
67 Steven D. Wasserman et al., Asbestos Litigation in California: Can it 
Change for the Better?, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 886 (2007). 
68 See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation in Madison County, 
Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 235, 243–44 
(2004). 
69 See id. 
70 See, e.g., Brian Brueggemann, Forum Participants: Investigate Madison 
County Court System, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Apr. 15, 2004; Sanford 
J. Schmidt, Lawyers Spar Over Asbestos Filings, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 15, 
2004. 
71 797 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. 2003). 
72 Id. at 694. 
73 840 N.E.2d 269 (Ill. 2005). 
74 Id. at 280–81. 
75 See Paul Hampel, Dismissal of Asbestos Suits is Change for Madison 
County, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 2005, at 6. 
76 See, e.g., Palmer v. Riley Stoker Corp., No. 04-L-167, 8–9 (Madison 
County Cir. Ct., Ill. Oct. 4, 2004) (order granting motion to transfer on the 
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first acts in this new role, the judge ordered the transfer of several 
out-of-state asbestos cases, noting that they “would place an 
astronomical burden upon the citizens of Madison County . . . . It 
is one thing to make such efforts to accommodate the citizens of 
Madison County and others whose cases bear some connection or 
reason to be here.”77 In 2004, asbestos litigation in Madison 
County dropped 50% to 477 filings; the number fell further to 389 
in 2005 and to 325 in 2006.78 
In the past few years, Delaware and California have attracted 
considerable attention as places to file asbestos claims.79 For 
example, the Madison County Record has observed that the number 
of new asbestos lawsuits dropped precipitously in Madison 
County in recent years, but the corresponding “deluge of filings is 
keeping clerks in a Delaware court working nights and weekends to 
keep up.”80 One Madison County lawyer acknowledged this 
                                                           
basis of forum non conveniens). 
77 Palmer v. Riley Stoker Corp., No. 04-L-167 (Madison County Cir. Ct., 
Ill. Oct. 4, 2004). 
78 Steve Gonzalez, Judges Not Worried About Madison County Asbestos 
Upsurge, THE RECORD, July 26, 2007, available at http://madisonrecord.com/ 
printer/article.asp?c=198493. 
79 See Steve Korris, Asbestos Shift to Delaware is Sign of Distinction for 
Madison County, THE RECORD, July 7, 2005, available at http:// 
madisonrecord.com/news/newsview.asp?c=162805; Wasserman et al., supra 
note 67, at 885 (“With plaintiff firms from Texas and elsewhere opening offices 
in California, there is no doubt that even more asbestos cases are on their way to 
the state.”); Hanlon & Smetak, supra, note 60, at 599 (“[P]laintiffs’ firms are 
steering cases to California, partly to the San Francisco-Oakland area, which is 
traditionally a tough venue for defendants, but also Los Angeles, which was an 
important asbestos venue in the 1980s but is only recently seeing an upsurge in 
asbestos cases.”); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Litigation Tourism Hurts 
Californians, 21:20 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: ASB. 20 (Nov. 15, 2006) 
(reporting that over 30% of pending asbestos claims sampled in California 
involve plaintiffs with out-of-state addresses); Emily Bryson York, More 
Asbestos Cases Heading to Courthouses Across Region, 28:9 L.A. BUS. J. 8 
(Feb. 27, 2006) (“California is positioned to become a front in the ongoing 
asbestos litigation war.”); Steven Weller et al., Report on the California Three 
Track Civil Litigation Study 28 (Policy Studies Inc. July 31, 2002), available 
at www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/BKST/BKST-3TrackCivJur.pdf (“The San Francisco 
Superior Court seems to be a magnet court for the filing of asbestos cases.”). 
80 Steve Korris, Delaware Court Seeing Upsurge in Asbestos Filings, THE 
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practice, stating, “We’re just filing [cases] in different places.”81 
This practice of “litigation tourism”82 is one of the main reasons 
the litigation has proved difficult to contain.83 
To avoid being a litigation tourist destination, trial courts 
should, as they do in Mississippi, permit defendants to motion for 
a more definite statement from the plaintiffs that jurisdiction is 
proper as to each claim.84 As a result of these motions, one 
Mississippi court “dismissed the claims of 437 non-resident 
plaintiffs who did not allege either exposure in the State of 
Mississippi to a defendant’s asbestos-containing product or claims 
against a Mississippi resident defendant.”85 The same court also 
dismissed several claims for failure to comply with a court order 
directing the plaintiffs to perfect transfer of the cases to their 
respective proper venues in Mississippi.86 Similar measures have 
been undertaken in Ohio.87 
                                                           
RECORD (Madison/St. Clair County, Ill.), July 1, 2005, available at 
http://madisonrecord.com/news/newsview.asp?c=162494. 
81 Brian Brueggemann, Asbestos Lawsuits Continue to Decline, 
BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, June 21, 2005, at 3B (quoting Mike Angelides 
of the SimmonsCooper firm). 
82 See AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2005, at 
46 (2005), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2005/Hellholes 
2005.pdf (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys become the ‘travel agents’ for the ‘litigation 
tourist’ industry, filing claims in jurisdictions with little or no connection to 
their clients’ claims.”). 
83 For example, in one case, an Indiana plaintiff with mesothelioma filed a 
claim against U.S. Steel in Madison County, Illinois, for injuries allegedly 
sustained from asbestos exposure at a U.S. Steel plant in Indiana. The plaintiff 
had no significant connection to Illinois, much less to Madison County. 
Nevertheless, his trial resulted in a $250 million verdict. See Brian 
Brueggemann, Man Awarded $250 Million in Cancer Case, BELLEVILLE 
NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Mar. 29, 2003, at 1A. 
84 See Gordon v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 962 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 2007); 
Culbert v. Johnson & Johnson, 883 So. 2d 550 (Miss. 2004) (transferring in-
state cases to the proper county and dismissing out-of-state plaintiffs). 
85 Id. at 549 n.3. 
86 Id. at 550. 
87 See OHIO CIV. R. 3(B)(11). 
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B. Prioritize Claims of the Truly Sick 
As discussed earlier, mass filings by unimpaired claimants have 
been a particular problem in asbestos litigation. Courts have found 
that the best guard against the continued filing of premature, or 
potentially fraudulent, claims by the unimpaired is to require all 
plaintiffs to develop the record early in the litigation regarding their 
alleged level of impairment and the credibility of their diagnoses 
upon which the claims are based. 
1. Checklist Item #2: Require plaintiff to show credible 
evidence of asbestos-related impairment in order to 
bring or proceed with a claim. 
Asbestos claimants generally have alleged various types of 
injuries, including mesothelioma, lung cancer and nonmalignant 
conditions that plaintiffs often refer to as asbestosis or pleural 
plaques. Mesothelioma is a type of cancer most often associated 
with asbestos exposure, though it has other causes and can occur 
idiopathically.88 For mesothelioma and lung cancer claims, a 
plaintiff should be required to present evidence verifying the 
condition with an exposure history and a credible doctor’s report 
certifying the condition as being asbestos-related. 
Allegations of nonmalignant asbestos-related conditions, such 
as asbestosis, are more challenging for courts because they are 
subject to misinterpretation and abuse. Many people merely allege 
radiographic evidence of asbestos exposure, but only people who 
are physically impaired from exposure to asbestos should be 
permitted to bring an asbestos claim. A court can determine 
whether the plaintiff has a legitimate claim by requiring the plaintiff 
to provide the court with three core pieces of information from a 
treating physician: (1) a thorough occupational, exposure, and 
medical history; (2) an x-ray showing markings on the plaintiff’s 
                                                           
88 See Thomas A. Sporn & Victor L. Roggli, Mesothelioma in 
PATHOLOGY OF ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED DISEASES 104, 108 (Victor Roggli et 
al., eds., 2d ed., Springer 2004) (1992) (stating evidence that between ten and 
twenty percent of mesothelioma cases are not asbestos-related, but are 
idiopathic). 
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lung that are consistent with asbestos exposure; and (3) a 
pulmonary function test showing breathing impairment outside of 
the normal range.89 
Trial courts have several options for handling claims that fail to 
meet all three of these base-line tests. First, the actions can be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim.90 Courts in Arizona, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, and Pennsylvania have held that 
physically unimpaired asbestos claimants do not have legally 
compensable claims.91 Federal courts interpreting Hawaii and 
Massachusetts laws have reached the same conclusion.92 As one of 
the courts explained, “[t]here is generally no cause of action in tort 
until a plaintiff has suffered an identifiable, compensable injury.”93 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further specified that in asbestos 
cases, markings in the pleural linings of the lung without any 
accompanying impairment does not create a “compensable injury 
which gives rise to a cause of action.”94 Individuals with these 
conditions, the court concluded, “lead active, normal lives, with no 
pain or suffering, no loss of an organ function, and no disfigurement 
due to scarring.”95 Thus, they have no claim. 
                                                           
89 See generally Dr. John E. Parker, Understanding Asbestos-Related 
Medical Criteria, 18-10 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 25 (June 18, 2003). 
90 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
91 See Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); 
In re Asbestos Litig. Leary Trial Group, Nos. 87C-09-24, 90C-09-79, 88C-09-
78, 1994 WL 721763 (Del. Super. June 14, 1994), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom. Mancari v. A.C. & S., Inc., 670 A.2d 1339 (Del. 1995); Bernier v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 
591 A.2d 544 (1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 604 A.2d 
47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 
(Pa.1996). 
92 See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 
1990); In re Mass. Asbestos Cases, 639 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1985). 
93 Bernier, 516 A.2d at 542. 
94 See Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237. 
95 Id. at 236; see also In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 
875, 1996 WL 539589, at *2 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996) (“Pleural disease is 
most often an asymptomatic scarring of the pleura—a tissue thin membrane 
surrounding the lung. Many states, including Pennsylvania, do not allow for a 
cause of action based upon this condition alone if it is asymptomatic. It can only 
be discovered through x-ray and, in and of itself, does not pose a health risk or 
  
 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRONT LINES 615 
Second, trial courts may administratively dismiss claims 
brought by the non-sick. For example, in the federal asbestos multi-
district litigation, the late Judge Charles Weiner administratively 
dismissed all cases where the plaintiff could not provide the court 
with sufficient medical evidence of a “compensable injury 
sufficient to sustain a cause of action,”96 stating that he would 
reinstate them if and when the claimant shows evidence of asbestos 
exposure and an asbestos-related disease.97 The order stated 
simply, “it is ORDERED that the referenced cases are dismissed 
without prejudice. The Statute of Limitations is tolled. Parties are 
to notify the Court if they wish these cases reactivated.”98 
Thousands of cases involving unimpaired claimants were dismissed 
under this and similar plans issued by this court. 
Finally, a trial court can create an inactive docket (also called a 
pleural registry or deferred docket) to set aside and preserve the 
claims of the non-sick.99 Inactive asbestos dockets were first 
adopted in the late 1980s and early 1990s in jurisdictions that were 
experiencing large numbers of filings by the unimpaired—
Massachusetts (September 1986), Chicago (March 1991), and 
Baltimore City (December 1992).100 Since 2002, the list of 
                                                           
impairment.”). 
96 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Civ. Action 
No. 2, 1996 WL 239863, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996). 
97 See id. 
98 See id.; In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Order 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1997). 
99 See Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in 
Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1992); see also In re 
Report of the Advisory Group, 1993 WL 30497, at *51 (D. Me. Feb. 1, 1993) 
(“[P]laintiffs need not engage in the expense of trial for what are still minimal 
damages, but are protected in their right to recover if their symptoms later 
worsen.”). 
100 See Mark A. Behrens & Monica Parham, Stewardship for the Sick: 
Preserving Assets For Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2001); In re Asbestos Pers. Injury & Wrongful Death 
Asbestos Cases, 1992 WL 12019620 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Md. Dec. 9, 
1992). The Massachusetts inactive docket has been “really a very good system 
that has worked out.” Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: Are They Easing the Flow 
of Litigation?, HARRISMARTIN’S COLUMNS: ASBESTOS, Feb. 2002, at 2 
(quoting Judge Hiller Zobel). Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Richard 
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jurisdictions with inactive asbestos dockets has grown to include 
Cleveland, Ohio (March 2006); Minnesota (coordinated litigation) 
(June 2005); St. Clair County, Illinois (February 2005); 
Portsmouth, Virginia (August 2004); Madison County, Illinois 
(January 2004); Syracuse, New York (January 2003); New York 
City (December 2002); and Seattle, Washington (December 
2002).101 In 2005, RAND referred to the “reemergence” of inactive 
dockets as one of “the most significant developments” in asbestos 
litigation.102 
2. Checklist Item #3: Establish the credibility of the diagnosis 
alleging injury by determining whether the claim was 
generated through a litigation screening or is supported 
by a report from a physician that has been implicated in 
fraudulent civil filings. 
A key turning point in the mass generation of asbestos claims 
was a landmark ruling in June 2005 by the manager of the federal 
silica multi-district litigation, U.S. District Judge Janis Graham Jack 
of the Southern District of Texas. Judge Jack recommended that all 
but one of the 10,000 federal court silica claims be dismissed on 
remand because the diagnoses were fraudulently prepared.103 Judge 
Jack said in her opinion: “[T]hese diagnoses were driven by neither 
health nor justice . . . . [T]hey were manufactured for money.”104 
                                                           
Rombro has said “the docket is working.” In re Pers. Injury & Wrongful Death 
Asbestos Cases, No. 24-X-92-344501, at 5 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Md. Aug. 
15, 2002) (Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Modification to 
Unimpaired Docket Medical Removal Criteria). 
101 See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, Asbestos Litigation: Momentum 
Builds for State-Based Medical Criteria Solutions to Address Filings by the 
Non-Sick, 20:6 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 33 (Apr. 13, 2005); Mark A. 
Behrens & Manuel López, Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: They Are 
Constitutional, 24 REV. LITIG. 253 (2005). 
102 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 15, at xx. 
103 See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig, MDL 1553, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 
642 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[T]here is only one of the 10,000 Plaintiffs whom the 
Court can say with confidence is genuinely injured.”). 
104 Id. at 635; see also Fred Krutz & Jennifer R. Devery, In the Wake of 
Silica MDL 1553, 4:5 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. SILICA 1, 2 (2006); Mike 
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The B readers and screening firms referenced in Judge Jack’s 
opinion have helped generate tens of thousands of asbestos claims. 
For example, it has been reported that seventy-two percent of the 
claimants before Judge Jack had filed asbestos-related claims,105 
even though it is “statistically speaking, nearly impossible” to 
suffer from both asbestosis and silicosis.106 Dr. Ray Harron 
reportedly diagnosed disease in 51,048 Manville claims and 
supplied 88,258 reports in support of other claims.107 In one day, 
Dr. Harron reportedly diagnosed 515 people, or the equivalent of 
more than one a minute in an eight-hour shift.108 Dr. James Ballard 
provided 10,700 primary diagnoses and another 30,329 reports in 
                                                           
Tolson, Attorneys Behind Silicosis Suits Draw U.S. Judge’s Wrath/Houston 
Legal Firm Fined; Order From Bench Says Diagnoses Made for the Money, 
HOUSTON CHRON., July 2, 2005, at A1; Mike Tolson, A Dozen Doctors, 
20,000 Silicosis Cases/By Signing Off, X-Ray Readers Put Names on Scandal, 
HOUSTON CHRON., May 8, 2006, at A1; Mike Tolson, Exposing the Truth 
Behind Silicosis, HOUSTON CHRON., May 7, 2006, at A1; Editorial, Silicosis, 
Inc., WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2005, at A20. 
105 See Editorial, Trial Bar Cleanup, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2006, at A8; 
see also Asbestos: Mixed Dust and FELA Issues: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Professor 
Lester Brickman, Cardozo Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
testimony.cfm?id=1362&wit_id=3963 (reporting that 60% of the federal court 
silica claimants had filed asbestos claims with the Manville Trust). 
106 Carlyn Kolker, Spreading the Blame: The So-Called Phantom Epidemic 
of Silicosis Has Become a Hot Potato for the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 27:10 AM. LAW., 
Oct. 2005, at 24. 
107 See Editorial, Silicosis Clam-up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at A18. 
108 See id. Recently, Dr. Harron reached an agreement with the Texas 
Medical Board that he will never again practice medicine in Texas. According to 
the medical board’s website:  
On April 13, 2007, the Board and Dr. Harron entered into an Agreed 
Order pursuant to which Dr Harron agreed not to practice medicine in 
the period before his medical license expires, not to renew his medical 
license after it expires and not to petition the Board for reinstatement or 
re-issuance of his license. 
News Release, Tex. Med. Bd., Medical Board Disciplines 34 Doctors (Apr. 18, 
2007), available at http://www.tmb.state.tx. us/news/press/2007/041807a.php. 
The Board acted “based on allegations related to silica/silicosis litigation and 
Dr. Harron’s determination and signature on x-ray findings of silicosis for 
numerous silicosis plaintiffs.” Id. 
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support of asbestos claims.109 According to Manville Trust 
records, Dr. Jay Segarra “participated in almost 40,000 positive 
diagnoses for asbestos-related illnesses over the last 13 years, or 
about eight per day, every day, including weekends and holidays. 
There were about 200 days on which Dr. Segarra rendered positive 
diagnoses for more than 20 people, and 14 days with more than 
50.”110 
Judge Jack’s findings have impacted, and will continue to 
impact, asbestos litigation.111 For example, the Court of Common 
Pleas of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio recently dismissed 
approximately 3,755 asbestos cases after the screening doctors, 
some of whom had been involved in the silicosis litigation, refused 
to testify, asserting their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.112 The court also put aside another 35,000 asbestos 
cases where plaintiffs were diagnosed by the same doctors until 
those plaintiffs receive diagnoses from other doctors.113 Similarly, 
Claims Resolution Management Corporation, which manages the 
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, has stated that it will 
no longer accept medical reports prepared by the doctors and 
screening companies that were the subject of Judge Jack’s 
opinion.114  
Several other trusts have followed Manville’s lead, including 
the Eagle-Picher, Celotex, Halliburton (DII Industries), and Keene 
Creditors Trusts.115 Most recently, the current manager of the 
                                                           
109 See Editorial, Silicosis Clam-up, supra note 107. 
110 Adam Liptak, Defendants See a Case of Diagnosing for Dollars, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A14. 
111 See Lester Brickman, On the Applicability of the Silica MDL 
Proceeding to Asbestos Litigation, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 289 (2006). 
112 See In re Cuyahoga County Asbestos Cases, Special Docket 73958 (Ct. 
Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County, Ohio Mar. 22, 2006); Peter Geier, Thousands of 
Asbestos Cases Dismissed, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 10, 2006, at 13. 
113 Davies, Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits Against Companies Sharply Decline, supra 
note 6, at A9. 
114 Memorandum from David Austern, President, Claims Resolution 
Management Corporation, Suspension of Acceptance of Medical Reports (Sept. 
12, 2005), available at http://www.claimsres.com/documents/9%2005%20 
Suspension%20Memo.pdf. 
115 Letter from William B. Nurre, Executive Director, Eagle-Picher Personal 
  
 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRONT LINES 619 
federal asbestos multi-district litigation docket, United States 
District Judge James Giles of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
stated that, because “[c]urrent litigation efforts in this court and in 
the silica litigation have revealed that many mass screenings lack 
reliability and accountability and have been conducted in a manner 
which failed to adhere to certain necessary medical standards and 
regulations,” the court will “entertain motions and conduct such 
hearings as may be necessary to resolve questions of evidentiary 
sufficiency in non-malignant cases supported only by the results of 
mass screenings which allegedly fail to comport with acceptable 
screening standards.”116 
Given the claim generation history, the credibility of claims 
must be properly scrutinized. Also, trial courts should join the 
recent movement to reject claims generated by the screening firms 
and physicians that were the subject of Judge Jack’s opinion. 
C. Apply Traditional Tort Litigation Procedures 
There is now a better understanding that creating separate, fast-
track procedures for asbestos cases fueled the claim-generation 
engine for unimpaired claimants by encouraging the settlement of 
claims without regard to their merits.117 In the last few years, 
                                                           
Injury Settlement Trust, to Claimants’ Counsel (Oct. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.cpf-inc.com/includes/content/PhysicianNotice.pdf; Notice of Trust 
Policy Regarding Acceptance of Medical Reports from John L. Mekus, 
Executive Director, Celotex Asbestos Settlement Trust (Oct. 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.celotextrust. com/news_details.asp?nid=22. 
116 In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Admin. Order No. 
8, 2007 WL 2372400, *2 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2007). 
117 Former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Conrad L. Mallet, Jr. 
described in testimony to Congress the pressure that trial court judges inundated 
with asbestos claims might feel to shortcut procedural rules:  
Think about a county circuit judge who has dropped on her 5,000 cases 
all at the same time . . . . [I]f she scheduled all 5,000 cases for one 
week trials, she would not complete her task until the year 2095. The 
judge’s first thought then is, “How do I handle these cases quickly and 
efficiently?” The judge does not purposely ignore fairness and truth, but 
the demands of the system require speed and dictate case consolidation 
even where the rules may not allow joinder. 
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courts have restored order to asbestos cases and effectively reduced 
incentives for new filings by unimpaired claimants. 
1. Checklist Item #4: Do not consolidate dissimilar claims. 
The use of joinder to consolidate dissimilar claims has been 
discredited and should not be allowed. In 2004, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court began severing multi-plaintiff asbestos-related 
cases.118 In 2006, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted an 
administrative order to preclude the “bundling” of asbestos-related 
cases for trial, stating that “each case should be decided on its own 
merits, and not in conjunction with other cases. Thus, no asbestos-
related disease personal injury action shall be joined with any other 
such case for settlement or for any other purpose, with the 
exception of discovery.”119 Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court 
amended the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure to preclude the joinder 
of pending asbestos-related actions for trial purposes.120 In 
addition, Georgia, Kansas, and Texas have enacted laws to prevent 
                                                           
The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1283 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 320 (1999) (statement 
of Former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Conrad L. Mallet, Jr.). 
118 See, e.g., Harold’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d 493 
(Miss. 2004); Albert v. Allied Grove Corp., 944 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2006); 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Rogers, 912 So. 2d 853 (Miss. 2005); Illinois Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 912 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 2005); 3M Co. v. Johnson, 895 
So. 2d 151 (Miss. 2005); Alexander v. ACandS, Inc., 947 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 
2007); see also Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for Business: 
The Transformation of Mississippi’s Legal Climate, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 393 
(2005); David Maron & Walker W. (Bill) Jones, Taming an Elephant: A 
Closer Look at Mass Tort Screening and The Impact of Mississippi Tort 
Reforms, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 253 (2007). 
119 Administrative Prohibition on “Bundling” Cases, MICH. L. WKLY., 
Aug. 9, 2006; see also Editorial, Unbundling Asbestos, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 
2006, at A10. 
120 See OHIO R. CIV. P. 42(A)(2) (“In tort actions involving an asbestos 
claim, . . . the court may consolidate pending actions for case management 
purposes. For purposes of trial, the court may consolidate pending actions only 
with the consent of all parties. Absent the consent of all parties, the court may 
consolidate, for purposes of trial, only those pending actions relating to the same 
exposed person and members of the exposed person’s household.”). 
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the joinder of asbestos cases at trial unless all parties consent.121 
These decisions are sound and should be followed. Apples and 
bananas may mix in a fruit salad, but not in asbestos litigation. 
2. Checklist Item #5: Assure discovery is proper for each 
claim and defendant; if “form” discovery is used in 
one’s jurisdiction, make sure it is appropriate and not 
overly burdensome as applied in individual cases. 
Some jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, use a standard form 
for discovery in asbestos cases that requires each defendant to 
respond to a sweeping set of interrogatories and production 
requests within 90 or 120 days of being served.122 In the past, 
these forms may have provided an effective and fair way to inject 
efficiency into asbestos litigation. The traditional asbestos 
defendants that were regularly named in asbestos litigation often 
had this information readily available, as they likely produced 
much of it in prior cases. 
Broad-based discovery tools, however, can be inefficient, 
unfair, and out-of-date when applied to newer defendants. For 
companies that may only be peripherally connected, if at all, to the 
alleged injury, responding to “one size fits all” standing discovery 
orders can be unduly costly and burdensome. For example, in one 
California case, Watts Regulator Companya valve 
manufacturerwas named in a lawsuit where the plaintiff alleged 
contact with one type of the company’s valves used on one day at 
one location.123 Despite the narrow scope of the plaintiff’s claim, 
the standing order required Watts to provide information on the 
identity and composition of all asbestos-containing products made 
or sold in a twelve year period, which reportedly amounted to 
                                                           
121 See KAN. ST. ANN. § 60-4902 (2006); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 90.009 (Vernon 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-11 (2007). 
122 In re Complex Asbestos Litig., No. 828684 (Cal. App. Dep’t. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 1, 1997) (general order re : New Filings), available at 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=10754 [hereinafter Gen. Order No. 
129 Re: New Filings]. 
123 See Petition for Review, In re Complex Asbestos Litig. (Watts 
Regulator Co.), No. 828864 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2007). 
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almost 2,000 unique products with more than a million different 
permutations.124 
As this example illustrates, orders to compel the production of 
substantial information that has no relevance to a case and will not 
result in the discovery of admissible evidence can be highly 
inappropriate. Assuming it is even possible to collect the 
information in the time period allowed, as a practical matter, 
companies would likely be coerced into settling claims regardless of 
their merits just to avoid spending the considerable time, money 
and resources it would take to comply with the standing order. 
Trial courts should follow traditional litigation procedures and 
only require defendants to produce information that is reasonably 
related to a plaintiff’s specific allegations and is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in the 
action.125 To the extent “form” discovery can still be a useful 
litigation tool, it should be updated regularly to reflect the many 
types of companies that are named in asbestos litigation and the 
many types of cases that are being brought today. Trial courts 
considering a form discovery order should seek input from the 
plaintiff and defense communities before issuing such an order. 
Courts also should allow objections by defendants to assure that a 
form’s discovery provisions are not overly burdensome as applied 
in individual cases.126 
3. Checklist Item #6: Do Not Short-Circuit Trials. 
Another trial management technique that should be avoided is 
arbitrary time limits for defendants’ to present their cases. For 
example, a San Francisco court recently limited the 124 defendants 
                                                           
124 See Petition for Review at 15, In re Complex Asbestos Litig. (Watts 
Regulator Co.), No. 828864 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2007). 
125 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
126 Under San Francisco Superior Court Order No. 129, a defendant may 
not object that the information is not reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence in the action and may not object that the 
discovery is unduly burdensome, except that a defendant may assert a “one-
time” burden objection in the first ninety days of the first suit against it. Gen. 
Order No. 129 Re: New Filings, supra note 122. 
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named in an asbestos action to 45 total hours, which amounted to 
thirty-six minutes per defendant to cross-examine plaintiffs and 
present their own cases. Such a limitation denies defendants basic 
procedural due process because their ability to mount a defense 
“will be hampered or even eliminated through actions of others 
over which these defendants have no control or lawful ability to 
control.”127 
D. Only Allow Claims Against Defendants Where There Is a 
Legal Basis for Liability 
Now in its fourth decade, the litigation has been sustained by 
the plaintiffs’ bar search for new defendants coupled with new 
theories of liability. As the litigation evolves, the connection to 
asbestos-containing products is increasingly remote and the 
liability connection more stretched. 
The issue of whether a legal duty exists between an asbestos 
plaintiff and a peripheral defendant who may have little or no 
connection to the alleged injury is increasingly becoming a central 
issue in the litigation. Unlike with most litigation, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in asbestos cases are not selective in naming as defendants 
only those companies that could have caused the harm. They 
typically name scores of defendants regardless of their actual 
connection to the plaintiff’s alleged injury. Nevertheless, as in 
other tort cases, the plaintiff must still meet his or her burden of 
proving that the defendant owed a legal duty before liability can be 
imposed.128 
                                                           
127 See Written Opposition to Certain Trial Procedures in Violation of Due 
Process at 2, Arts v. Asbestos Defendants, No. 417505 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed 
July 17, 2007). 
128 Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976), reargument 
denied, 362 N.E.2d 640 (N.Y. 1977). 
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1. Checklist Item #7: Premises owners generally should owe 
no duty to plaintiffs alleging harm from off-site, 
secondhand exposure to asbestos. 
A newer duty issue is whether a premises owner may be held 
liable for injuries to workers’ family members who have been 
exposed to asbestos off-site, typically through contact with a 
directly exposed worker or that worker’s soiled work clothes.129 In 
earlier years, the litigation was focused mostly on the 
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products. Most of those 
companies have been forced to seek bankruptcy court protection. 
As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers began to target “peripheral 
defendants,” including premises owners, for alleged harms to 
independent contractors exposed to asbestos. Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
are now targeting property owners for alleged harms to secondarily 
exposed “peripheral plaintiffs.” 
Since the beginning of 2005, a growing number of courts have 
decided whether premises owners owe a duty to “take home” 
exposure claimants. The duty has been rejected by the highest 
courts in Georgia,130 New York,131 and Michigan;132 Texas133 and 
                                                           
129 See Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, A Potential New Frontier 
in Asbestos Litigation: Premises Owner Liability for “Take Home” Exposure 
Claims, 21:11 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 32 (July 5, 2006). 
130 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005). 
131 See In re New York City Asbestos Litig. (Holdampf v. A.C. & S., 
Inc.), 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); see also In re Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Asbestos Litig. (Rindfleisch v. AlliedSignal, Inc.), 12 Misc. 3d 936, 815 
N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2006). 
132 See In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of 
Texas (Miller v. Ford Motor Co.), 740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007). 
133 See Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 2007 WL 2949524 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 
2007) (no duty owed because harm from non-occupational exposure to asbestos 
was not reasonably foreseeable at time of plaintiff’s exposure); see also Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Altimore, 2007 WL 1174447 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2007) 
(withdrawn Aug. 9, 2007) (premises owner owed no duty to an employee’s wife 
injured by pre-1972 exposure to asbestos brought home on her husband’s work 
clothing). 
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Iowa134 appellate courts; a Delaware trial court,135 and a Kentucky 
federal court.136 Earlier, a Maryland appellate court reached the 
same conclusion.137 The New Jersey Supreme Court is the only 
court of last resort to go the other way.138 A few appellate courts 
have found a duty to exist in some circumstances.139 
A broad new duty requirement for landowners would allow 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to begin to name countless premises owners 
directly in asbestos and other suits. As one commentator has 
explained, 
If the law becomes clear that premises-owners or 
employers owe a duty to the family members of their 
employees, the stage will be set for a major expansion in 
premises liability. The workers’ compensation bar does not 
apply to the spouses or children of employees, and so 
allowing those family members to maintain an action against 
the employer would greatly increase the number of 
potential claimants. Moreover, people who claim to be 
injured from take-home exposure, especially children, have 
very appealing facts and tend to be much younger than 
other claimants. These factors all flow together in support 
                                                           
134 See Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 2008 WL 141194 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Jan. 16, 2008). 
135 See In re Asbestos Litig. (Riedel v. ICI Americas, Inc.), 2007 WL 
4571196 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007) (unpublished). 
136 See Martin v. General Elec. Co., 2007 WL 2682064 (E.D. Ky. Sep. 5, 
2007) (unpublished). As this article went to press, plaintiffs were appealing the 
Martin ruling in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
137 See Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 705 A.2d 58 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1998). 
138 See Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006). 
139 See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation, Inc., 2007 WL 1159416 (Tenn. 
App. Apr. 19, 2007), appeal granted (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007); Chaisson v. 
Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2006); Zimko v. American 
Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 2005), writ denied, 925 So. 2d 538 (La. 
2006); Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 2325214 (Wash. App. 
Aug 13, 2007) (unpublished); Honer v. Ford Motor Co., 2007 WL 2985271 
(Cal. App. Oct. 15, 2007); Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 2004 WL 
1932847 (Cal. App. Aug. 31, 2004). 
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of high values for these claims.140 
The courts that have rejected a new duty rule for premises 
owners have recognized that tort law must draw a line between the 
competing policy considerations of providing a remedy to 
everyone who is injured and of extending tort liability almost 
without limit. As the Michigan Supreme Court explained, 
“imposing a duty on a landowner to anybody who comes into 
contact with somebody who has been on the landowner’s 
property” would create “a potentially limitless pool of 
plaintiffs.”141 Potential plaintiffs might include anyone who came 
into contact with an exposed worker or his or her clothes, such as 
co-workers, children living in the house, extended family members, 
renters, house guests, baby-sitters, carpool members, bus drivers, 
and workers at commercial enterprises visited by the worker when 
he was dirty, as well as local laundry workers or others that 
handled the worker’s clothes. 
Trial courts would be wise to heed the concerns raised by the 
high courts of Georgia, New York, and Michigan, and dismiss 
premises owners from cases brought by persons exposed off-site. 
2. Checklist Item #8: Maintain traditional tort law distinctions 
for when premises owners can be liable for injuries to 
contractors’ employees. 
In asbestos litigation, the issue of landowner liability for harms 
caused to contractors’ employees arises in two types of situations. 
First, some personal injury lawyers have asserted liability against 
landowners when the contractor was specifically hired to perform 
                                                           
140 Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos Litigation in the 21st Century: 
Developments in Premises Liability Law in 2005, SL041 ALI-ABA 665, 694 
(2005). 
141 In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of 
Texas, 740 N.W.2d at 200; see also Adams, 705 A.2d at 66 (“If liability for 
exposure to asbestos could be premised on [decedent’s] handling of her 
husband’s clothing, presumably Bethlehem [the premises owner] would owe a 
duty to others who came into close contact with [decedent’s husband], including 
other family members, automobile passengers, and co-workers. Bethlehem owed 
no duty to strangers based upon providing a safe workplace for employees.”). 
  
 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRONT LINES 627 
the work that caused the injury—in this case, working with 
products that contained asbestos.142 The Nevada Supreme Court, 
however, ruled in Knutson v. Battle Mountain Gold Co.143 that a 
premises owner does not owe such a duty of care to contractors’ 
employees144 because the independent contractor is in a better 
position than the premises owner to take special precautions to 
protect against any peculiar damages associated with working on 
the premises.145 The Delaware Supreme Court echoed that 
sentiment: “If the independent contractor, through its work, causes 
the condition that might otherwise give rise to landowner 
liability . . . employees of that independent contractor have no 
basis to claim that the landowner is liable for injuries resulting from 
that condition.”146 
Second, a contractor’s employee may sue a landowner for 
asbestos related exposures resulting from work of another 
independent contractor on the same premises. The Delaware 
Supreme Court, however, ruled that landowners cannot be liable 
“solely because they knew of the existence of a latent hazard on 
their premises.”147 Rather, two additional elements must be shown: 
“ignorance of the latent hazard on the part of the contractor and its 
employees and the failure to warn of the latent condition or to take 
other appropriate action.”148 The California Supreme Court has 
                                                           
142 See, e.g., Knutson v. Battle Mountain, Gold Co., No. 46504 (Nev. July 
20, 2007) (Order of Affirmance). 
143 Id. 
144 See also General Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007); 
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 2007 WL 2458027 (Tex. Aug. 31, 
2007), petition for reh’g filed (Nov. 19, 2007). 
145 See Knutson, No. 46504, at 4 (internal citations omitted). 
146 In re Asbestos Litig., 897 A.2d 767 (table), 2006 WL 1214980 (Del. 
Apr 12, 2006) (unpublished); see also In re Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 1651964 
(Del. Super. May 31, 2007) (unpublished), aff’d sub nom. Wenke v. E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours and Co., 2008 WL 187940 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2008); In re 
Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 1651968 (Del. Super. June 25, 2007) (unpublished). 
147 In re Asbestos Litig., 2006 WL 1214980, at *2. 
148 Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 states:  
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to 
his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or 
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
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supported these principles, remanding a case for a new trial so that 
jury instructions could reflect that “the hirer/landowner who has 
not retained control over the work, and who was not itself actually 
on notice of a concealed hazardous condition that causes injury, 
should not be derivatively or vicariously liable for injuries 
contemporaneously inflicted by an independent contractor on 
another contractor’s employee.”149 That court found it persuasive 
“that reasonable safety precautions against the hazard of asbestos 
were readily available, such as wearing an inexpensive 
respirator.”150 Trial courts should follow these well-reasoned 
decisions. 
3. Checklist Item #9: Component part manufacturers should 
not be held liable for alleged asbestos-related hazards in 
external or replacement parts made, supplied, or 
installed by others and affixed post-manufacture. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have also begun naming manufacturers of 
non-asbestos components (typically pumps and valves) in product 
liability actions alleging that the component part maker had a duty 
to warn of hazards in asbestos-containing components or finished 
products made by others.151 These claims should be dismissed; it is 
well established “[a]s a general rule, [that] component sellers 
should not be liable when the component itself is not defective.”152 
This rule was embodied in the Restatement, Third, Products 
Liability and has been found to apply even where the supplier 
                                                           
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such 
invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to 
exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
149 Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., 123 P.3d 931, 945 (Cal. 2005). 
150 Id. at 939. 
151 See Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 151 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2007), review granted, No. 80251-3 (Wash. Jan. 8, 2008); Simonetta v. Viad 
Corp., 151 P.3d 1019 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007), review granted, No. 80076-6 
(Wash. Jan. 8, 2008). 
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 (1997); see 
also Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1992). 
  
 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRONT LINES 629 
knew its product may be integrated into a finished product that 
may cause harm.153 The reporters of the Restatement chose their 
rules based on public policy rather than numbers of cases or bias 
toward any party. 
To place a duty to warn on a defendant for harms caused by 
others’ products, or the use of others’ products, is contrary to two 
long-standing tort law principles: (1) that economic loss should 
ultimately be borne by the one who caused it, and (2) that the 
manufacturer of a particular product is in the best position to warn 
about risks associated with it. As the Restatement (Third) 
Products Liability explains, “[i]f the component is not itself 
defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability 
solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated 
product utilizes the component in a manner that renders the 
integrated product defective.”154 
Furthermore, expanding liability for failure to warn under these 
circumstances would be “untenable and unmanageable.”155 Such a 
duty rule would lead to “legal and business chaosevery product 
supplier would be required to warn of the foreseeable dangers of 
numerous other manufacturers’ products. . . .”156 “For example, a 
syringe manufacturer would be required to warn of the danger of 
any and all drugs it may be used to inject, and the manufacturer of 
bread would be required to warn of peanut allergies, as a peanut 
butter and jelly sandwich is a foreseeable use of bread.”157 
Packaging companies might be held liable for hazards regarding 
contents made by others. There are many other examples that 
                                                           
153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 cmt. a 
illus. 1 (1997); see also Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 562 N.W.2d 198 (Mich. 1997). 
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 cmt. a 
(1997). 
155 Thomas W. Tardy III & Laura A. Frase, Liability of Equipment 
Manufacturers for Products of Another: Is Relief in Sight?, HARRISMARTIN 
COLUMNS: ASBESTOS, May 2007, at 6. 
156 John W. Petereit, The Duty Problem With Liability Claims Against 
One Manufacturer for Failing to Warn About Another Manufacturer’s Product, 
TOXIC TORTS & ENV’TL L. 7 (Defense Research Inst. Toxic Torts & Env’tl L. 
Comm. Winter 2005). 
157 Tardy & Frase, supra note 155, at 6. 
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could be provided. 
Consumer safety also could be undermined by the potential for 
over-warning (the “Boy Who Cried Wolf” problem) and through 
conflicting information on different components and finished 
products.158 
 
E. Only Allow a Defendant To Be Held Liable If Its Conduct or 
Product Was a Legal Cause of the Alleged Injury 
For issues relating to both general and specific causation, courts 
should require that plaintiffs provide precise and credible 
allegations against each defendant early in the litigation and exercise 
their judicial responsibility to require the application of well-
grounded science in causation arguments.159 General causation 
exists when a substance can cause an injury or condition in the 
general population; specific causation exists when the substance is 
the cause of a specific person’s injury.160 Unlike some 
environmental contamination cases, there is no defined incident of 
exposure, and the latency period can take several decades.161 This 
                                                           
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 cmt. a. 
(1997); Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: 
The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 38, 43 (1983) (“The extension of workplace warnings liability unguided 
by practical considerations has the unreasonable potential to impose absolute 
liability. . . .”). 
159 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 
1997) (in toxic tort cases, a plaintiff has a burden of showing both general 
causation—that the substance the plaintiff was allegedly exposed to can generally 
cause the condition claimed—and specific causation—that the specific exposure 
was a substantial cause of the specific harm). 
160 Id. at 714; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey, 187 S.W.3d 265, 270 
(Tex. App. 2006) (“Proving one type of causation does not necessarily prove 
the other, and both are needed in situations where direct, reliable medical testing 
for specific causation has not taken place.”). 
161 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AGENCY FOR TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, ASBESTOS TOXICITY: WHAT RESPIRATORY 
CONDITIONS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH ASBESTOS?, available at http://www.atsdr. 
cdc.gov/csem/asbestos/respiratory_changes2.html (observing latency periods of 
ten to fifty years). 
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circumstance is partly why “most plaintiffs sue every known 
manufacturer of asbestos products,”162 notwithstanding the 
plaintiff’s marginal contact, if any, with a particular defendant’s 
product. It is incumbent on trial courts, therefore, to dismiss 
defendants where causation cannot be established and instruct 
jurors on how to make appropriate causation decisions.163 
1. Checklist Item #10: Make gatekeeper decisions on expert 
testimony and assure that materials experts rely on 
actually support their opinions. 
Trial courts should hold preliminary hearings to scrutinize the 
reliability of expert opinions and to determine whether there is a 
risk of disease associated with a particular asbestos exposure. 
There are different types, length and concentrations of asbestos 
fibers,164 and plaintiffs’ lawyers are increasing the number of 
                                                           
162 Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
163 In some cases, especially where the plaintiffs are sympathetic, courts 
have relaxed specific causation requirements to allow a case to go to trial or to 
encourage settlement. The ability to recover absent proof of causation is 
considered by many legal observers to be a key cause of the rapid expansion in 
recent years of claims alleging asbestos-related injuries. See Steven Hantler, 
Toward Greater Judicial Leadership on Asbestos Litigation, CIVIL JUSTICE 
FORUM, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, Apr. 2003, at 6–8 
(“[D]uring the course of discovery some of the defendants are dismissed on 
motions for summary judgment because there has been no evidence of any 
contact with any of such defendants’ asbestos-containing products. Other 
defendants may be required to go to trial but succeed at the verdict stage.”); but 
see Pearson v. Garlock Sealing Tech., No. 2001-297 (Tex. Dist. Ct. order Jan. 
25, 2005) (granting defendant’s summary judgment motion because plaintiff’s 
expert testimony attempting to link Garlock’s gaskets to plaintiff’s peritoneal 
mesothelioma failed to satisfy admissibility standards). HarrisMartin reported 
that Pearson’s settlements with other defendants totaled an estimated $20 
million. See Texas Judge Awards Garlock Summary Judgment in Mesothelioma, 
HARRISMARTIN’S COLUMNS: ASBESTOS, Feb. 2005, at 12. 
164 See, e.g., Becker v. Baron Bros., Coliseum Auto Parts, Inc., 649 A.2d 
613, 620 (N.J. 1994) (trial court erred in instructing jury that all asbestos-
containing friction products without warnings are defective as a matter of law: 
“Our courts have acknowledged that asbestos-containing products are not 
uniformly dangerous and thus that courts should not treat them all alike.”); 
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diseases they claim are asbestos-related.165 
One particularly helpful tool is the epidemiological study. For 
example, as discussed later in this section, some experts claim that 
it may only take one fiber to cause certain asbestos-related 
ailments, including mesothelioma.166 In comparing this claim to 
epidemiological studies, an Ohio federal judge in Bartel v. John 
Crane, Inc.167 ruled that testimony alleging “that every breath 
[plaintiff] took which contained asbestos could have been a 
substantial factor in causing his disease, is not supported by the 
medical literature.”168 The court said that it would accord “less 
weight” to that testimony.169 
Where consistent, significant, and clear epidemiology exists, as 
in Bartel, courts have begun scrutinizing and, when appropriate, 
rejecting expert opinions that contradict those studies.170 Carefully 
                                                           
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(Tex. law) (“[A]ll asbestos-containing products cannot be lumped together in 
determining their dangerousness.”); Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 
533, 538 (Fla. 1985) (“Asbestos products . . . have widely divergent toxicities, 
with some asbestos products presenting a much greater risk of harm than 
others.”). 
165 See Jonathan M. Samet, Asbestos and Causation of Non-Respiratory 
Cancers: Evaluation by the Institute of Medicine, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1117 
(2007). 
166 See infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
167 316 F. Supp. 2d 603 (N.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d sub nom. Lindstrom v. 
A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005). 
168 Id. at 611. 
169 Id. 
170 See, e.g., Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 885–86 
(10th Cir. 2005) (“This is not a case where there is no epidemiology. It is a 
case where the body of epidemiology largely finds no association between 
silicone breast implants and immune system diseases. . . . We are unable to find 
a single case in which a differential diagnosis that is flatly contrary to all of the 
available epidemiological evidence is both admissible and sufficient to defeat a 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.”); Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 
F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (numerous reputable epidemiology studies 
contradicted plaintiffs’ theory); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 
1316 (11th Cir. 1999) (plaintiffs’ “proffered conclusions . . . were out of sync 
with the conclusions in the overwhelming majority of the epidemiological 
studies presented to the court.”); Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 
661, 665 (M.D. La. 2000) (causation claim contradicted by “a number of 
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conducted pre-trial judicial “gatekeeper” hearings can bring these 
and other important causation issues to light and reduce the 
likelihood that liability can be based on speculative or discredited 
testimony. 
2. Checklist Item #11: Adhere to traditional elements of 
substantial factor causation at summary judgment and 
provide clear jury instructions as to whether a particular 
defendant’s asbestos was a “substantial factor” in 
causing the alleged harm. 
In cases where a plaintiff alleges multiple sources of exposures, 
which occurs regularly in asbestos litigation, courts must compare 
exposures to determine whether a particular source was a 
“substantial factor” in causing the alleged injury.171 When a 
defendant’s product could not have been a substantial factor in 
causing the claimed injury, the defendant must be dismissed—even 
when the defendant’s conduct could have been a “negligible” or 
“insubstantial” cause of the injury.172 For example, if there is clear 
evidence of long-term, substantial exposure to asbestos from one or 
more sources, incidental exposures cannot be deemed to be 
substantial causes of the alleged disease.173 
                                                           
scientifically performed studies which demonstrate no association” between 
benzene and CML), aff’d, 247 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2001). 
171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965). The term 
“substantial cause” is sometimes referred to as a “substantial contributing 
cause” or a “substantial factor in.” 
172 Id. at § 431 cmt. d (“While it is necessary to the existence of liability 
for negligence that the defendant’s negligent conduct be a substantial factor in 
bringing about harm to another, this of itself is not necessarily conclusive. There 
are certain rules which operate to relieve a negligent actor from liability because 
of the manner in which his negligence produces it, even though his negligent 
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing it about. These rules are stated in §§ 
435–453.”). 
173 See id. at cmt. a (“The word ‘substantial’ is used to denote the fact that 
the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead 
reasonable men to regard it as a cause . . . rather than in the so-called 
‘philosophical sense’ which includes every one of the great number of events 
without which any happening would not have occurred.”). 
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“The most frequently used test for causation in asbestos cases 
is the ‘frequency-regularity-proximity test’ announced in 
Lohrmann.”174 In Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,175 the 
Fourth Circuit formulated this test in determining whether a 
specific asbestos product contributed to, or was a substantial cause 
of, the plaintiff’s injuries.176 The plaintiff, having gone to trial 
against seven asbestos product manufacturers, had argued that if he 
could “present any evidence that a company’s asbestos-containing 
product was at the workplace while the plaintiff was at the 
workplace, a jury question has been established as to whether that 
product contributed as a proximate cause to the plaintiff’s 
disease.”177 The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument, and adopted 
the rule employed by the district court judge, providing that 
whether a plaintiff could get to the jury (or defeat a motion for 
summary judgment) “would depend upon the frequency of the use 
of the product and the regularity or extent of the plaintiff’s 
employment in proximity thereto.”178 Many courts have applied 
the Lohrmann (or a Lohrmann-like) causation standard.179 
                                                           
174 Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(applying Lohrmann to an asbestos claim governed by Texas law). 
175 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986). 
176 See id. at 1163. 
177 Id. at 1162. 
178 Id. 
179 See, e.g., Gregg v. V.J. Auto Parts, Inc., 2007 WL 4557811, *9 (Pa. 
Dec. 28, 2007); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 323 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007), 
reh’g denied (Oct. 12, 2007); Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 724 
(S.C. 2007); Gorman-Rupp Co. v. Hall, 908 So. 2d 749 (Miss. 2005); 
Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 2005); Chavers v. General 
Motors Corp., 79 S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 2002); Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., 
994 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Ark. law); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. 
Balbos, 604 A.2d 445 (Md. 1992); Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 
449 (Ill. 1992); Vaughn v. Ford Motor Co., 91 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.  2002) 
(applying Ill. law); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854 
(Iowa 1994); Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), 
appeal denied, 553 A.2d 968 and 553 A.2d 969 (Pa. 1988); Robertson v. 
Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pa. law); James v. 
Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898 (N.J. 1998); Sholtis v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196, 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) Jones 
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 69 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying N.C. 
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Accordingly, a trial court should carefully evaluate the potential 
culpability of named defendants and dismiss those defendants 
where the plaintiff has not put forth sufficient facts to support a 
“frequency, regularity, proximity test” at summary judgment.180 
For claims that go to trial, courts should instruct the jury that in 
order to find against a specific defendant, a plaintiff alleging 
multiple exposure sources must present evidence (1) of exposure to 
a “specific product” attributable to the defendant, (2) “on a regular 
basis over some extended period of time,” (3) “in proximity to 
where the plaintiff actually worked,” (4) such that it is probable 
that the exposure to the defendant’s product caused plaintiff’s 
injuries.181 
Importantly, courts should avoid suggestions that substantial 
cause should be characterized in terms of risk. Some personal 
injury lawyers and their experts have suggested that it should be 
sufficient that a defendant’s exposure is a substantial factor in the 
risk of asbestos disease.182 This mistaken notion arose from a 
California Supreme Court opinion adopting the substantial cause 
test because the court, perhaps unintentionally, equated risk with 
cause.183 California courts that have followed this path have 
                                                           
law); Chism v. W.R. Grace & Co., 158 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying 
Mo. law); Kraus v. Celotex Corp., 925 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 
(applying Mo. law); Lyons v. Garlock, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Kan. 
1998) (applying Kan. law); Dillon v. Fibreboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (applying Okla. law); Blackston v. Shook and Fletcher Insulation 
Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Ga. law).  
 The Lohrmann causation standard also is the law in a number of states that 
have enacted medical criteria requirements for asbestos cases. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2307.96(B), FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 774.203(30)-204 (applying to 
certain claims); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-3(23). 
180 See Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(applying the frequency, regularity, and proximity test and finding that the 
plaintiff did not establish that most of the named defendants had any exposure to 
the products). 
181 Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162–63 (4th 
Cir. 1986). 
182 See Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 897. 
183 See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1223 (Cal. 
1997) (“[T]he plaintiff may meet the burden of proving that exposure to 
defendant’s product was a substantial factor causing the illness by showing that 
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reduced California’s causation standard to a minimal threshold; 
essentially allowing a claim to be based on any exposure that “is 
not negligible, theoretical, or infinitesimal.”184 Being a substantial 
risk is not the same as being a substantial factor in the cause of 
asbestos disease and, therefore, is contrary to the doctrines set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) and in Lohrmann, as well as 
sound science.185 Trial courts in California and elsewhere should 
avoid weakening this fundamental concept in tort law that a 
defendant, in order to be deemed liable, must have had some part—
and in these cases a substantial one—in actually causing the 
plaintiff’s harm. 
3. Checklist Item #12: Assure specific and adequate product 
identification by dismissing cases where product 
identification is not sufficient. 
Because of the practice of naming scores, sometimes hundreds, 
of defendants, product identification can be particularly weak, such 
as the vague recollection by a co-worker that a particular 
defendant’s product was at a workplace.186 Trial courts, 
consequently, should and do regularly dismiss defendants at 
summary judgment for lack of proper product identification.187 
Discovery requests and subsequent summary judgment motions 
from individual defendants should be permitted early in the process 
                                                           
in reasonable medical probability it was a substantial factor contributing to the 
plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing cancer.”) (emphasis added). 
184 See Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 897. 
185 See Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 961 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (“Establishing that the risk of causation 
‘is not zero’ falls woefully short of the degree of proof required by Daubert and 
its progeny.”). 
186 See, e.g., Campbell ex rel. Estate of Campbell v. Flintkote Co., No. 
1298 May. Term 1997, 93 Oct. Term 1998, 2000 WL 33711047, at *4 (Pa. 
Com. Pl. Nov. 7, 2000) (“[V]ague and oftentimes uncertain assertions . . . [are] 
not enough for the Plaintiff to sustain her burden.”). 
187 See, e.g., id.; Smith v. A-Best Prods. Co., No. 94-CA-2309, 1996 WL 
80533, at *4 (Ohio App. 4 Dist. Feb. 20, 1996) (holding that plaintiff must 
prove exposure to each defendant’s product and that the product was a 
substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury). 
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so that defendants, especially peripheral defendants, are not 
pressured to engage in “nuisance” settlements to avoid the costs of 
defending the litigation. 
Trial courts should adhere to the traditional tort law principle 
that a plaintiff must be able to identify a particular manufacturer as 
a cause of the alleged injuries.188 It is insufficient to establish the 
mere presence of asbestos in the workplace. At minimum, a 
plaintiff must show a specific defendant’s asbestos product was 
used near where the plaintiff worked. As a Philadelphia trial court 
wrote: “[A plaintiff] must prove that he worked in the vicinity of 
the product’s use. . . . Product identity can be established where 
the record shows that plaintiff inhaled asbestos fibers shed by that 
manufacturer’s specific product.”189 
Some states consider product identification as part of the 
Lohrmann substantial factor analysis.190 For example, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held, “the proper test to be used is the 
frequency, regularity, and proximity standard to show product 
identification of the defendants’ actual products, exposure of the 
plaintiffs to those products, and proximate causation as to the 
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.”191 
4. Checklist Item #13: Issue disease-specific causation 
requirements for mesothelioma, lung cancer and other 
asbestos-related cancers. 
 a. Mesothelioma 
Mesothelioma cases can be the most challenging for trial courts 
and juries because the plaintiffs can be particularly sympathetic. 
Notwithstanding the desire to assist those with this deadly form of 
                                                           
188 See Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(“The mere fact that [defendant’s] asbestos products came into the facility does 
not show that the decedent ever breathed these specific asbestos products or that 
he worked where these asbestos products were delivered.”). 
189 Campbell, 2000 WL 33711047, at *2 (internal citations omitted). 
190 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 2005). 
191 Id. at 137. 
  
638 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
cancer, it is important that plaintiffs’ lawyers only seek recovery 
from those whose products may have caused the disease. One 
theory that plaintiffs’ lawyers and their experts have used to 
expand the pool of potential defendants, as alluded to above, is the 
so-called “any fiber” theory.192 The single fiber theory suggests 
that any exposure to asbestos, regardless of quantity, duration or 
frequency, contributes to the development of asbestos disease.193 
This theory has been increasingly scrutinized by the courts 
because, according to epidemiological studies and leading scientific 
experts, the theory violates the fundamental toxicology tenet that 
dose makes the poison.194 
For example, in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores,195 the Texas 
Supreme Court rejected the “single fiber” theory, holding that in 
order to prove causation, a plaintiff must show “[d]efendant-
specific evidence relating to the approximate dose to which the 
plaintiff was exposed, coupled with evidence that the dose was a 
substantial factor in causing the asbestos-related disease.”196 The 
trial judge responsible for administering the Texas asbestos docket 
agreed, stating that the single fiber theory “confuses the difference 
between a potential cause and a substantial cause, and encourages 
speculation on how little exposure, and how infrequently the 
exposure must take place, before causation can be said to have been 
proven.”197 
Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently rejected 
                                                           
192 See Mark A. Behrens & William L. Anderson, The “Any Exposure” 
Theory: An Unsound Basis for Asbestos Causation and Expert Testimony,  
_ SW. U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2008). 
193 Bartel v. John Crane, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (N.D. Ohio 
2004), aff’d sub nom. Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
194 See generally, David L. Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts— A 
Primer in Toxicology for Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 5, 15 (2003) 
(“The relationship between dose and effect (dose-response relationship) is the 
hallmark of basic toxicology.”). 
195 232 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007), reh’g denied (Oct. 12, 2007). 
196 Id. at 773. 
197 Letter from Judge Mark Davidson, 11th District Court, Texas, to 
Counsel, In re Asbestos, No. 2004-3, 964, at *3 (July 18, 2007) (on file with the 
Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law & Policy). 
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the any exposure theory in Gregg v. V.J. Auto Parts, Inc.198 Gregg 
involved allegations that personal car repair work on brakes and 
gaskets caused plaintiff’s mesothelioma, resulting in a lawsuit 
against the auto parts store that sold Mr. Gregg the parts he used. 
The primary holding in the case dealt with the application of the 
“frequency, proximity, and regularity” test, but in the course of the 
discussion the Court majority expressed a clear rejection of the any 
exposure approach: 
We recognize that it is common for plaintiffs to submit 
expert affidavits attesting that any exposure to asbestos, no 
matter how minimal, is a substantial contributing factor in 
asbestos disease. However, we share Judge Klein’s 
perspective, as expressed in the Summers [v. Certainteed 
Corp., 886 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 2005)] decision, that such 
generalized opinions do not suffice to create a jury question 
in a case where exposure to the defendant’s product is de 
minimis, particularly in the absence of evidence excluding 
other possible sources of exposure (or in the face of 
evidence of substantial exposure from other sources). As 
Judge Klein explained, one of the difficulties courts face in 
the mass tort cases arises on account of a willingness on the 
part of some experts to offer opinions that are not fairly 
grounded in a reasonable belief concerning the underlying 
facts and/or opinions that are not couched within accepted 
scientific methodology.199 
While recognizing the occasional difficulty of proving which of 
plaintiff’s exposures contributed to the disease, Pennsylvania’s 
highest court nevertheless rejected the easy way out of simply 
stating that all exposures are responsible: 
[W]e do not believe that it is a viable solution to indulge in a 
fiction that each and every exposure to asbestos, no matter 
how minimal in relation to other exposures, implicates a 
fact issue concerning substantial-factor causation in every 
“direct-evidence” case. The result, in our view, is to subject 
defendants to full joint-and-several liability for injuries and 
                                                           
198 No. 38 EAP 2005, 2007 WL 4557811 (Pa. Dec. 28, 2007). 
199 Id. at **8 (internal citations omitted). 
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fatalities in the absence of any reasonably developed 
scientific reasoning that would support the conclusion that 
the product sold by the defendant was a substantial factor 
in causing the harm.200 
In the last three years, a growing number of other courts in 
multiple jurisdictions have excluded or criticized any exposure 
causation testimony, either as unscientific under a 
Daubert201/Frye202 analysis or as insufficient to support causation. 
This pattern of decisions includes: 
• a Texas appellate court in a mesothelioma case rejecting 
testimony that any dry wall exposures above 0.1 
fibers/cc year would be a substantial contributing 
factor;203 
• an Ohio federal district court and the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in a gasket and packings case;204 
• two Pennsylvania state trial judges rejecting the any 
exposure testimony in mechanic cases and another  
criticizing the theory’s application in a pleural disease 
case;205 
• a federal bankruptcy court in litigation involving 
                                                           
200 Id. at **9. 
201 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
202 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
203 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens, 239 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App. 
2007). 
204 See Bartel v. John Crane, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (N.D. Ohio 
2004), aff’d sub nom. Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
205 See In re Toxic Substance Cases (Vogelsberger v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.), 
2006 WL 2404008, *7–8 (Pa. Com. Pl., Allegheny County, Aug. 17, 2006) 
(holding expert’s “any fiber” opinion inadmissible under Frye standard), on 
appeal sub nom. Betz v. Pneumo-Abex, LLC, No. 1058 WDA 2006 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2007); Basile v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 
11484 CD 2005, slip op. at 8–12 (Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 22, 2007) (precluding 
expert from testifying that “all asbestos exposures substantially contributed to 
and caused the Plaintiff Decedent’s mesothelioma”); Summers v. Certainteed 
Corp., 886 A.2d 240, 244 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal granted, 897 A.2d 460 
(Pa. 2006). 
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asbestos in vermiculite insulation;206 
• a Mississippi appellate court that rejected a medical 
monitoring class for persons allegedly exposed in a 
school building;207 and 
• a Washington trial court decision rejecting an any 
exposure opinion in a heavy equipment mechanic 
case.208 
These decisions are sound, as a matter of law and science, and 
should be adopted elsewhere. 
One complicating factor in mesothelioma cases is that, while 
mesothelioma is generally associated with asbestos exposure, it has 
been estimated that between ten and twenty percent of all 
mesothelioma patients contract their disease from non-asbestos 
sources.209 At this point the cause of these illnesses is unknown.210 
Nevertheless, it clearly would be inappropriate for courts to allow 
plaintiff’s lawyers to pursue litigation under the theory that 
asbestos exposure must have caused a plaintiff’s mesothelioma. 
Courts must require causation standards to be met. 
b. Lung Cancer 
The key issue for courts with lung cancer cases is to distinguish 
between lung cancers caused by asbestos exposure and those from 
other causes. The plaintiff must “offer competent evidence that 
asbestos exposure, more likely than not, caused [plaintiff’s] lung 
cancer, and also to negate with reasonable certainty [plaintiff’s] 
heavy smoking history as the other plausible cause of his lung 
cancer.”211 
In cases involving heavy smokers, plaintiffs’ lawyers have tried 
to get around this task by suggesting that there is a synergistic 
                                                           
206 See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 355 B.R. 462, 474, 478 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2006), leave to appeal denied, 2007 WL 1074094 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2007). 
207 See Brooks v. Stone Arch., P.A., 934 So. 2d 350 (Miss. App. 2006). 
208 Anderson v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., No. 05-2-04551-5SEA (Wash. 
Super. Oct. 31, 2006) (Transcript of bench ruling at 144–45). 
209 See Sporn & Roggli, supra note 88, at 108. 
210 See id. 
211 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey, 187 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. App. 2006). 
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effect between smoking and asbestos exposure in causing lung 
cancer.212 Under such a theory, asbestos can cause lung cancer even 
where the plaintiff does not have asbestosis.213 As a Texas 
appellate court held in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey,214 trial courts 
should not admit expert testimony asserting these theories because 
they have not been shown to be relevant and reliable.215 With such 
novel scientific theories of causation, “[c]areful exploration and 
explication of what is reliable scientific methodology in a given 
context is necessary.”216 Smoking and other potential causes for 
lung cancer, therefore, must be accounted for in cases alleging lung 
cancer from asbestos-related exposures. 
 c. Other Forms of Cancer 
Personal injury lawyers also have filed asbestos-related claims 
for more general types of cancer, such as cancers of the colon, 
kidney, rectum, larynx, stomach, pharynx and esophagus.217 Courts 
adhering to Daubert, Frye or other such sound scientific screening 
standards should reject these claims because the science does not 
support a causal link between asbestos and these other cancers.218 
With regard to colon cancer, for example, some cases have been 
filed where asbestos bodies and fibers have been found in the 
plaintiff’s colon.219 Presence of asbestos fibers, however, does not 
                                                           
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. at 271–72. 
216 Id. at 274 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 
706, 719 (Tex. 1997)). 
217 See Jonathan M. Samet, Asbestos and Causation of Non-Respiratory 
Cancers: Evaluation by the Institute of Medicine, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1117 
(2007). 
218 See Letter from Dr. James D. Crapo to U.S. Sen. Jon Kyl (July 23, 
2003), in S. Rep. No. 108-118, at 148 (“Compensation by the FAIR Act for 
forms of cancer other than lung cancer and mesothelioma is not justified by 
current medical science.”). 
219 See Alani Golanski, General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort 
Cases, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 479, 491–96 (2003). 
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create a causal relationship between those fibers and any cancer.220 
The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, which has 
published the broadest look into theories of causal relationships 
between selected cancers, including colon cancer, and asbestos, 
found that there is “not sufficient [evidence] to infer a causal 
relationship between asbestos exposure and colorectal cancer.”221 
Accordingly, courts applying sound scientific principles have 
rejected these claims.222 
As discussed above, epidemiological studies can be an 
important tool for courts in assessing such new theories of 
causation. Again, in the context of colon cancer, a number of 
epidemiologists and medical organizations have expressly 
determined that asbestos exposure does not cause colon cancer.223 
For example, one study in the Los Angeles area concluded 
“occupational exposure to asbestos is not a risk factor for colon 
cancer.”224 Similarly, a 2004 study found that “[c]urrent 
epidemiology does not support the link between asbestos exposure 
and adenocarcinoma of the colon.”225 Yet, some personal injury 
                                                           
220 Id. 
221 INST. OF MED. COMM. ON ASBESTOS: SELECTED HEALTH EFFECTS, 
ASBESTOS: SELECTED CANCERS (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 2006) (“The 
overall lack of consistency or of the suggestion of an association among the case-
controlled studies (even those of the highest quality) and the absence of 
convincing dose-response relationships in either type of study design, however 
weigh against causality.”).  
222 See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 
1037–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting judgment as a matter of law on the ground 
that epidemiological studies failed to demonstrate a sufficiently strong and 
consistent association between asbestos and colon cancer); Washington v. 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 839 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
expert testimony that plaintiff’s colon cancer “could have been due to asbestos 
exposure lacked probative value because it was pure speculation based on 
negative inferences”); but see Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp. 591 A.2d 671, 
675–77 (N.J. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing grant of summary judgment on these 
grounds). 
223 See, e.g., David H. Garabrant et al., Asbestos and Colon Cancer: Lack 
of Association in a Large Case-Control Study, 135(8) AM. J. OF 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 843–53 (1992). 
224 Id. 
225 Sporn & Roggli, supra note 88, at 108. 
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lawyers continue to file these cases.226 When such novel theories of 
causation are proffered, courts should perform their gatekeeper 
function to reject them unless and until credible science can 
establish such a link. 
F. Assure That Juries Can Fully Compensate Deserving 
Plaintiffs While Preserving Assets For Future Claimants 
1. Checklist Item #14: Permit discovery of settlement trust 
claims, as well as any pre-trial settlements, and declare 
intentions to file any future claims. 
Ohio trial court Judge Harry Hanna showed the importance of 
allowing defendants to seek discovery of claim forms that a 
plaintiff’s lawyers had previously submitted to settlement 
trusts.227 In Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,228 he “exposed 
one of the darker corners of tort abuse” in asbestos litigation: 
inconsistencies between allegations made in open court and those 
submitted to settlement trusts or other funds set up by bankrupt 
companies to pay asbestos-related claims.229 
As the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported, “[Judge] Hanna’s 
order effectively opened a Pandora’s box of deceit . . . Documents 
from the six other compensation claims revealed that [plaintiff’s 
lawyers] presented conflicting versions of how Kananian acquired 
his cancer.”230 In addition, emails and other documents from the 
                                                           
226 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Answer to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Defendant, Honeywell Int’l (Allied Signal/Bendix), Larson v. Honeywell Int’l 
Corp., No. 3627 (Pa. Com. Pl. filed Mar. 30, 2007). 
227 See Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. CV 412750 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County Jan. 18, 2007) (order and opinion). 
228 Id. 
229 Editorial, Cuyahoga Comeuppance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at 
A14; see also Paul Davies, Plaintiffs’ Team Takes Hit on Asbestos, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 20, 2007, at A4; Thomas J. Sheeran, Ohio Judge Bans Calif. Lawyer 
in Asbestos Lawsuit, CIN. POST, Feb. 20, 2007, at A3; Editorial, Going Too 
Far, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 2007, at 8A. 
230 James F. McCarty, Judge Becomes National Legal Star; Bars Firm 
Form Court Over Deceit, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 25, 2007, at B1 
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plaintiff’s attorneys showed that “the client has accepted monies 
from entities to which he was not exposed,” and one settlement 
trust form was “completely fabricated.”231 In all, Mr. Kananian 
reportedly collected $700,000 from trusts and settlements.232 The 
Wall Street Journal has editorialized that Judge Hanna’s opinion 
should be “required reading for other judges” to assist in providing 
“more scrutiny of ‘double dipping’ and the rampant fraud inherent 
in asbestos trusts.”233 
Other courts have recognized the discoverability of claim forms 
submitted by plaintiffs to asbestos-related bankruptcy trusts.234 In 
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, for example, a 
California appellate court issued a writ of mandamus, stating that it 
would be an unjustifiable denial of discovery for the trial court to 
not allow defendants to discover documents submitted to 
bankruptcy trusts by the plaintiff’s attorney in support of the 
plaintiff’s claims to those trusts for compensation for the alleged 
asbestos-related injuries.235 Likewise, Texas trial courts are granting 
                                                           
(“In one claim, the lawyers said Kananian had been exposed to asbestos while 
working as a welder around insulated pipes. In another claim they said he 
welded for only two weeks while on a ship in the Philippines. In a third claim, 
the lawyers said the victim had been exposed to asbestos at the San Francisco 
Naval Shipyard at a time when Kananian testified he was a rifleman who merely 
had passed through the port on board a troopship.”). 
231 Lorillard Tobacco Co.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to 
Disqualify Chris Andreas and the Brayton Purcell Firm, Kananian v. Lorillard 
Tobacco Co., No. 442750, 2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County Nov. 13, 
2006). 
232 See Kimberley A. Strassel, Trusts Busted, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2006, 
at A18. 
233 Editorial, Cuyahoga Comeuppance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at 
A14; see also Daniel Fisher, Double-Dippers, 178:4 FORBES 136 (Sept. 4, 
2006). 
234 See Strassel, supra note 232, at A18; see also Skonberg v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 576 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 580 
N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991); In re New York City Asbestos Litig. (Negrepont v. 
A.C. & S, Inc.), No. 120894/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. City Dec. 11, 2003) 
(hearing transcript); Drabczyk v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 2005-1535 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Erie County Jan. 18, 2008). 
235 139 Cal. App. 4th 1481 (2006); see also Seariver Maritime, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 2006 WL 2105431, at *5 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. July 28, 2006) 
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motions to compel responses to interrogatories directed to asbestos 
claimants regarding claims and settlements made or expected to be 
made with any bankruptcy trust.236 In New Jersey, a discovery 
master for the court overseeing that state’s consolidated asbestos 
docket recommended that production of claim forms be directed, 
explaining that, whether or not ultimately admissible in evidence, 
such documents reveal discoverable factual information regarding 
plaintiffs’ alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products.237 
Most recently, a New York trial court acted to head off 
gamesmanship in filing practices by requiring plaintiff’s counsel to 
file all claim forms that they intend to file within ninety days 
before the start of trial, and produce such forms to defendants.238 
The court cautioned that if plaintiff’s counsel ignored the order and 
filed claim forms with bankruptcy trusts at a later date, the court 
would “vacate any verdict if it is against the Defendant.”239 
By allowing such discovery, and preventing gamesmanship, 
courts can better prevent an unscrupulous claimant from trying to 
tell one story to a bankruptcy trust and a different story to the 
jury in a civil action. Transparency with respect to claim forms 
also creates proper pressure on plaintiffs’ lawyers to file more 
consistent and accurate bankruptcy trust claims. 
                                                           
(unpublished). 
236 Duncan v. A.W. Chesterton, No. 2004-07671 (Tex. Harris County 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2006) (“[T]he information as documents related to plaintiff’s 
bankruptcy claims are discoverable.”); Brassfield v. Alcoa, No. 2006-08035 
(Tex. Harris County Dist. Ct. Nov. 9, 2006) (“The Defendants are entitled to 
production of the applications from the trusts in order to introduce them into 
evidence at the trial of the case.”). 
237 Szostak v. A-B Elec. Supply Co., No. L-12453-97 (Mass. Middlesex 
County Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2006). 
238 See Cannella v. Abex, Nos. 1037729/07, 105609/03, 105136/07, 
107449/07, 104144/07, 106808/07, 117395/06, 116617/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
N.Y. County Jan. 24, 2007) (hearing transcript). 
239 Id. at 46. 
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2. Checklist Item #15: Assure proper settlement credits and 
offsets at trial with monies paid by any entity to satisfy a 
legal claim directed at the injury alleged in accordance 
with state law. 
An important way to assure that litigation resources are 
preserved for future claimants, while allowing current claimants to 
be fully compensated, is to properly offset judgments with 
settlement credits and trust receipts. Given the mass numbers of 
defendants typically named in the litigation, the final sum of all 
settlements is often substantial. In addition, as discussed in the 
previous section, most plaintiffs also collect funds from 
bankruptcy trusts in satisfaction of a claim outside of the litigation 
process. With several large trusts coming online with assets totaling 
$30 billion in 2007 and 2008,240 “[f]or the first time ever, trust 
recoveries may fully compensate asbestos victims.”241 
Trial courts should expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers will try to 
affect the off-set calculation. One tactic plaintiff’s lawyers have 
used is to include in the settlements they reach with most 
defendants that only a small portion, if any, of those settlements 
will be used to off-set any judgment against the remaining 
defendants; they will then argue that these side agreements should 
“control the allocation of set-offs.”242 As can be expected, courts 
have rejected these efforts because they “subvert the findings of 
the trier of fact” in assessing liability.243 Courts also have 
recognized that plaintiffs and their lawyers have an undisputed 
“interest in allocating as little as possible” of settlements to final 
judgments.244 
In addition, some plaintiffs’ lawyers have argued, as in New 
                                                           
240 See Strassel, supra note 232, at A18. 
241 Charles E. Bates & Charles H. Mullin, Having Your Tort and Eating it 
Too?, 6:4 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 1 (Nov. 2006). 
242 See Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 920 (discussing several ways 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys in California have attempted to influence off-sets). 
243 Jones v. John Crane, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005). 
244 Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240, 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000). 
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York asbestos cases, that because of the automatic stay of litigation 
against bankruptcy trusts, a plaintiff cannot obtain effective 
jurisdiction over the trust and, consequently, monies received from 
those trusts should not be included in the off-set calculations.245 
Judge Freedman, who oversees New York City’s asbestos docket, 
has wisely rejected this argument, holding that the culpability of 
tortfeasors who are bankrupt and, therefore, not a party to the 
case, will be included when calculating a defendants’ liability under 
New York law.246 The impact of this issue in asbestos litigation, 
she recognized, “is especially pronounced, because of the large 
number of potentially culpable parties that have filed for 
bankruptcy.”247 
In the face of these and similar efforts, trial courts must assure 
that the controlling allocation formula is applied in ways that are 
reasonable and fair.248 
                                                           
245 See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 750 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472–73 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002). 
246 Id. at 479. 
247 Id. at 473. 
248 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979) (“A payment 
made by a tortfeasor or by a person acting for him to a person whom he has 
injured is credited against his tort liability, as are payments made by another 
who is, or believes he is, subject to the same tort liability.”); see also Burns v. 
Stouffer, 100 N.E. 2d 507 (Ill. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that it is reversible error 
not to credit an amount received from a joint tortfeasor); see generally Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen, Understanding State Contribution Laws and Their Effect 
on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1702 (1995) 
(discussing various approaches to state contribution laws); Brittany L. Wills, 
To Settle or Not to Settle?: The Calculation of Judgments Among Nonsettling 
Defendants in Texas, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 529, 536 (2000) (focusing on Texas 
contribution laws). 
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3. Checklist Item #16: Allow certain collateral sources to be 
admissible so that jurors can consider and account for 
all collateral sources that provided compensation to the 
plaintiff for the alleged harm. 
To further preserve resources for future claimants, trial courts 
should dedicate “any amount paid by anybody, whether they be 
joint tort-feasors or otherwise,” that have compensated a plaintiff 
for the asbestos-related harm at issue.249 This calculation should 
include collateral sources when a plaintiff’s initiative did not 
generate the source of the funds.250 Generally, the collateral source 
rules provide that damages awarded by a jury are not reduced by 
the amount of compensation or benefits that the plaintiff received 
from sources other than the defendant, even when the plaintiff did 
not use his or her own assets to help create those sources of 
funding.251 A North Carolina appellate court in Schenk v. HNA 
Holdings, Inc.252 reviewed the impact of the collateral source rule 
on modern asbestos litigation and affirmed a trial court’s decision 
to offset plaintiffs’ verdict awards by amounts collected through 
workers’ compensation benefits.253 Given the mature state of 
                                                           
249 Schenk v. HNA Holdings, Inc., 613 S.E.2d 503, 509 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. 
Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule and Its Abolition: An Economic 
Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 59 (2005)); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2). 
250 Where a plaintiff’s initiative generated the source of the funds, such as 
by purchasing life insurance, it may not be appropriate for the court to allow 
such evidence before a jury. 
251 The collateral source rule “ordains that, in computing damages against a 
tortfeasor, no reduction be allowed on account of benefits received by the plaintiff 
from other sources, even though they have partially or wholly mitigated his 
loss.” John Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort 
Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966). 
252 613 S.E.2d 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). For a more developed 
discussion as to why collateral sources should be admitted in strict products 
liability cases, see Victor Schwartz, Strict Liability and the Collateral Source 
Rule Do Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REV. 569 (1986). 
253 Id. at 510. 
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asbestos litigation today, the Schenk Court provides an 
appropriate method for preserving litigation resources. 
Taking this step can be particularly important where joint and 
several liability still applies, as jurors may want to spare 
defendants from providing windfall benefits for harm they did not 
cause. Such a system also allows juries to assist in rationing the 
remaining litigation resources while still preventing those plaintiffs 
from bearing the costs for their own bills.254 
4. Checklist Item #17: Instruct jurors on the state’s joint and 
several liability rules. 
In asbestos litigation, dozens, even hundreds, of companies 
may be named as potentially responsible parties, but most settle 
and “usually only one or, at most, a couple of defendants remain” 
at trial.255 These defendants likely are only peripherally related to 
the alleged injury and named mostly for their “deep pockets.” To 
help jurors accurately assess liability, courts should include in jury 
instructions an explanation of the state’s joint and several liability 
laws.256 
When juries are not informed of the effect of joint and several 
liability, they can be led to believe that a peripheral asbestos 
                                                           
254 Informing the jury in this manner recognizes the jurors’ fundamental role 
as “the judge of the facts.” Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and 
the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. REV. 523, 523 (1991); see also Whiteley v. 
OKKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir. 1983) (“The determination of 
damages is traditionally a jury function. . . . The jury must have much 
discretion to fix the damages deemed proper to fairly compensate the plaintiff.”). 
255 Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 917. 
256 Joint and several liability holds a defendant responsible for an entire 
harm, even though a jury has determined that it was only partially responsible. 
“The clear trend over the past several decades has been a move away from joint 
and several liability.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF 
LIABILITY § 17 cmt. a (2000). As of this writing, about forty states have either 
abolished or modified their joint liability rules. See Hantler et al., supra note 
32, at 1147–51. Another approach to the one discussed in this section would be 
for courts to abolish joint liability in asbestos cases altogether. See Richard L. 
Cupp, Jr., Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc 
Public Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203 
(2004). 
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defendant “will only be liable for a small contribution to the total 
damage award and the main defendant will be liable for the 
remainder.”257 Such “blindfold rules,”258 no matter how well-
intended, may result in setting a “trap for the uninformed jury.”259 
The jury will not know that the “deep pocket defendant may be 
liable for the entire award, with little hope of contribution from the 
party that is mainly at fault.”260 Concern about this issue in general 
litigation has caused several state supreme courts to implement 
“sunshine rules,” requiring trial courts to inform juries of joint and 
several liability rules.261 These courts have found that it is “better 
to equip jurors with knowledge of the effect of their findings than 
to let them speculate in ignorance and thus subvert the whole 
judicial process.”262 This concern about the ability of the judicial 
system to competently adjudicate such claims is particularly 
pressing in asbestos litigation, where the dynamics of the 
peripheral defendant tend to dominate most cases. 
For this reason, San Francisco Superior Court Judge Stephen 
Allen Dombrink, provided such a jury instruction in response to a 
defense motion.263 He instructed the jury that, under California 
                                                           
257 Julie K. Weaver, Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability in 
Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 457, 471 (1992). 
258 See generally Jordan H. Leibman et al., The Effects of Lifting the 
Blindfold from Civil Juries Charged with Apportioning Damages in Modified 
Comparative Fault Cases: An Empirical Study of the Alternatives, 35 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 349 (1998). 
259 Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal & Welding Co., 743 P.2d 61, 64 (Idaho 
1987) (citing Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683 (Idaho 1978)). 
260 Id. 
261 See, e.g., Reese v. Werts Corp., 397 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1985) (holding 
that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the effects of its verdict on 
the plaintiff’s recovery); Decelles v. State, 795 P.2d 419, 419–21 (Mont. 1990) 
(“We think Montana juries can and should be trusted with the information 
about the consequences of their verdict.”); Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 
P.2d 883, 884, 886 (Wyo. 1987) (holding that statute provided that the court 
must “inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict”). 
262 Id. 
263 See Horr v. Allied Packing, No. RG-03-104401, slip op. at *2 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. App. Dep’t Feb. 13, 2006). The proposed order stated:  
“If you find [Defendant] liable for any percentage of fault, [Defendant] 
will be responsible to pay for its proportionate share of any non-
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law, any finding of a proportionate share of liability for economic 
damages would result in the defendant being responsible for the full 
amount of economic damages.264 Judge Dombrink had faith that 
juries are responsible enough to handle this knowledge.265 A similar 
instruction has recently been issued in Los Angeles County 
Superior Court.266 
5. Checklist Item #18: Sever or strike punitive damages 
claims. 
Finally, courts should sever or strike punitive damages claims 
in asbestos cases because it is unsound public policy to allow such 
awards in modern asbestos cases.267 The purpose of punitive 
damages generally is to punish specific wrongdoers, deter them 
from committing wrongful acts again, and deter others in similar 
situations from committing wrongful behavior.268 The message of 
                                                           
economic damages you may award. With respect to economic damages, 
[Defendant] will be responsible for the full amount of those damages 
less a proportionate share of any settlements that may have been made 
by other defendants.” Id. 
264 Id. (approving the following jury instruction: “If you find Dentsply 
liable for any percentage of fault, Dentsply will be responsible to pay for its 
proportionate share of non-economic damages you may award. With respect to 
economic damages, Dentsply will [be] responsible for the full amount of those 
damages less a proportionate share of any settlements that may have been made 
by other defendants.”). 
265 See id. (“The proposed instruction will aid the jury in determining the 
proper amount of damages and making the proper allocation of the ratio of 
settlement percentages as between the economic and noneconomic damages.”). 
266 See Reporter’s Daily Transcript of Proceedings, at 41, Mikul v. Bondex 
Int’l, No. BC332247 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2006) (“If you 
find a Defendant liable for any percentage of fault, that defendant will be 
responsible to pay for its proportionate share of any noneconomic damages you 
may award. With respect to economic damages, that defendant will be 
responsible for the full amount of those damages, less a proportionate share of 
any settlements that may have been made by other Defendants.”). 
267 See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Barry M. Parsons, Responsible Public 
Policy Demands an End to the Hemorrhaging Effect of Punitive Damages in 
Asbestos Cases, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 137 (2001). 
268 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 
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deterrence, both specific and general, has been heard loud and clear 
in asbestos cases. At this phase in litigation, punitive damages have 
an unintended and unfortunate effect—they “threaten fair 
compensation to [pending and future] claimants” who await their 
recovery, and “threaten . . . the economic viability of [peripheral] 
defendants.”269 The problem is exacerbated when punitive damages 
are repeatedly assessed against a company in different trials for the 
same or similar underlying conduct.270 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
approved a decision by Judge Weiner, who oversaw the federal 
multi-district litigation for asbestos cases, to sever all punitive 
damages claims from federal asbestos cases before remanding 
compensatory damages cases for trial.271 The Third Circuit, quoting 
liberally from a 1991 Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc 
Committee on Asbestos Litigation, said that its decision was based 
on “compelling” public policy: 
Although there may be grounds to support an award, 
multiple judgments for punitive damages in the mass tort 
context against a finite number of defendants with limited 
assets threaten fair compensation to pending claimants and 
future claimants who await their recovery, and threaten the 
economic viability of the defendants. To the extent that 
some states do not [sic] permit punitive damages, such 
awards can be viewed as a malapportionment of a limited 
fund. Meritorious claims may go uncompensated while 
earlier claimants enjoy a windfall unrelated to their actual 
damages.272 
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Third Circuit strongly urged 
state courts to sever or stay punitive damages claims in asbestos 
                                                           
(2003). 
269 JUD. CONF. REP., supra note 11, at 3, 5. 
270 See William W. Schwarzer, Punishment Ad Absurdum, 11 CAL. LAW 
116 (1991) (“Barring successive punitive damage awards against a defendant for 
the same conduct would remove the major obstacle to settlement of mass tort 
litigation and open the way for the prompt resolution” of legitimate claims.”). 
271 In re Collins,233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000). 
272 Id. 
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cases to preserve assets for sick claimants.273 Several state courts 
have done so, including trial courts in Baltimore City;274 
Northampton County (Bethlehem and Easton), Pennsylvania; 
Philadelphia;275 and New York City.276 Florida has enacted a law 
banning punitive damages “in any civil action alleging an asbestos 
or silica claim.”277 
Trial courts should follow these examples and sever punitive 
damages in order to preserve funds to compensate the truly sick. 
This step should be taken in the early stages of litigation because of 
the leveraging effect punitive damages have at the settlement 
table.278 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing checklist items were born in jurisdictions where 
the asbestos litigation crisis is most prolific and best understood. 
The common theme is that they facilitate the resolution of claims 
on their merits. Specifically, they focus scarce litigation resources 
on the claims of those truly impaired from asbestos exposure, 
allow defendants to exculpate themselves when they or their 
                                                           
273 See id. (“It is discouraging that . . . some state courts allow punitive 
damages in asbestos cases. The continued hemorrhaging of available funds 
deprives current and future victims of rightful compensation.”). 
274 See Keene Corp. v. Levin, 623 A.2d 662, 663 (Md. 1993) (noting that 
trial court deferred payments of punitive damages “until all Baltimore City 
plaintiffs’ compensatory damages are paid”). 
275 See Third Circuit Rehears Dunn Arguments en banc, 8:1 MEALEY’S 
LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 20 (Feb. 5, 1993) (“[The] Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas has a basic ‘standing order’ that all punitives are to be 
stayed . . . .”). 
276 See $64.65 Million Awarded in Four Asbestos Cases, 4:18 MEALEY’S 
LITIG. REP.: TOXIC TORTS 16 (Dec. 15, 1995) (reporting on a New York case 
in which the trial court severed and deferred punitive damages indefinitely). 
277 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.207(1) (West 2005). 
278 See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1398 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he potential for punitive awards is a weighty factor in 
settlement negotiations, . . . [and] assets that could be available for satisfaction 
of future compensatory claims are dissipated”), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1031 (1993). 
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products could not have caused the harm alleged, cut down on the 
gaming of the legal system, and preserve assets for future 
claimants. To employ these checklist items most effectively, courts 
should require plaintiffs early in their lawsuits to provide facts 
relating to the nature of their damages and to each defendant. By 
separating out the colorable claims as soon as practicable, the 
nation’s judges can maintain the current momentum towards 
restoring order and sound public policy to asbestos cases. 
 
